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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I study ways in which regulatory institutions affect firms in India. The first chap-
ter (coauthored with Michael Gechter) investigates the effects of an important but little-researched
set of Indian labor regulations which only apply to establishments that hire 10 or more employees.
Using data from India’s 2005 Economic Census, we observe that the distribution of establishments
by size closely follows a power law, but with a significant drop in the distribution for establishments
with 10 or more workers. By fitting this distribution to a model of firm size choice in the presence of
size-based regulations, we use this break in the observed distribution to estimate the implied costs of
the regulation. In the second chapter I examine whether the speed of courts contributes to economic
growth. I do this by making the assumption - following Nunn (2007) - that fast courts should be
more beneficial to firms in contract-intensive industries, where contract intensity is measured by the
proportion of inputs in an industry that cannot be bought on an organized exchange. Using data on
Indian firms covering the period 1999-2008 I find that firms profits and value-added grew faster in
contract-intensive industries that were located in states with faster courts. The third chapter (also
coauthored with Michael Gechter) examines the effects of removal of regulations between 2001-06
that had previously reserved certain products for exclusive production by firms with capital below a
certain threshold. Our main finding is that de-reservation led to an increase in firm investment and
output by certain groups of firms.
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1Chapter 1
Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Firm Size
Distribution (co-authored with Michael Gechter)
1.1 Introduction
India’s labor and industrial regulations have been blamed for many of the country’s ills, including
low levels of aggregate productivity, slow growth of productivity, and lackluster job creation in
the formal sector1 (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Besley and Burgess (2004); Hasan and Jandoc
(2012); Kochhar et al. (2006)). Of particular note is Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s landmark study, in
which the authors argue that aggregate total factor productivity in India could be 40%-60% higher if
not for significant misallocation of resources across firms. They go on to suggest that India’s labor
regulations may be to blame for the observed misallocation, although they leave the job of fully
corroborating this link to others. In fact, the view that labor regulations are of primary importance
is not universally held. Many argue that the laws as written are rarely enforced so that, in practice,
firms are effectively unconstrained.2 Others argue that the existing evidence on the detrimental
impact of labor regulations is flawed (Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009)). Still others point out that the
vast majority of regulations have gone unstudied while nearly all of the attention from economists
and the press has focused on a single regulation (Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act) - one
that is not likely to constrain any but the very largest firms (Bardhan (2014)).3
It is the goal of this paper to address the above aspects of this debate while avoiding some of the
criticisms that have been leveled at previous work. In particular, we use a novel methodology and
a uniquely well-suited dataset to study the behavior of firms in response to regulatory thresholds
1Here and elsewhere in the paper, the formal sector refers to business enterprises that are registered with some branch
of the government.
2For instance, in a recent paper, Chaurey (2015) provides evidence that firms seem to hire contract workers as a way
of avoiding certain regulations.
3Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) stipulates that firms in the industrial sector with 100 or more workers
must obtain permission from the relevant governmental authority before laying off workers. Bardhan (2014) points out
that 92 percent of firms in the garment sector have fewer than 8 workers.
2in order to determine whether and to what extent firms are in fact constrained by regulations.4 We
proceed in the following steps. First, we generate the establishment-size distribution using data from
the Economic Census of India (EC), which, importantly, aims to be a complete enumeration of all
non-farm business units, regardless of size or status (formal or informal). From the distribution, we
observe that it closely follows a power law, except for a discontinous and proportional decrease in
the density of establishments with 10 or more workers. This is precisely the threshold at which a
multitude of regulations become legally binding, so we take this observation as evidence that firms
with 10 or more workers do seem to be constrained in size by certain regulations - although these
are not the same regulations that most others have focused on. We then develop a model of firm
size choice under regulatory thresholds which is based on Garicano et al. (2013) (henceforth GLV),
but augmented to explicitly allow for the possibiliy of misreporting.5 We model the regulations
as causing an increase in the unit labor costs of those firms that report having exceeded the 10
worker threshold6, and then use the observed distortion in the size distribution to estimate these
costs. Under our primary estimation method at the All-India level, we find that firms behave as if
operating at or above the 10-worker threshold entailed a 35% increase in their per-worker costs.
Our next step is to document substantial heterogeneity in the size of our estimated costs along
several dimensions including state, industry and ownership type. For example, we find that the
state with the highest estimated regulatory costs is Bihar and that privately-owned establishments
have the highest costs, while government-owned establishments have the lowest. Exploring this
variation further, we find that our estimated costs turn out to be correlated with some previous state-
level measures of labor regulation reforms (in particular, certain measures from Dougherty (2009)),
though not with others (for example, the Besley-Burgess measure from Aghion et al. (2008)).7
4Note: for expositional purposes we occasionally refer to “firms”, although it would be more correct to refer to “fac-
tories” or “establishments”, since all of the data and most of the regulations are at the factory/establishment level rather
than the firm level. Regardless, the disinction is almost moot: nearly all Indian firms are single factory/establishment
firms.
5Misreporting was a lesser concern in GLV’s original setting, as they had access to administrative data. In contrast,
the data in the Economic Census are self-reported, which makes the threat of deliberate misreporting more significant in
our case.
6This is the only way to generate a proportional decrease in the theoretical density, at least in a static model.
7This may reflect the fact that the Besley-Burgess measures focus on the IDA, while the regulations we study are
entirely different. On the other hand, if the Besley-Burgess measures are meant to capture the general effect of labor laws
3Moreover, we find strong and robust correlations between our estimated costs and two quite distinct
measures of corruption8, even after controlling for a number of factors including state GDP per
capita. As further support for our state-level results, we show that industries with greater “regulatory
dependence” have higher estimated costs, but only when they are located in more corrupt states.9
We take these correlations to be suggestive of the fact that the true cost of the regulations may have
more to do with bureacracy and corruption, rather than the content of labor and industrial regulations
themselves.
Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of the possible dynamic consequences of the costs we
estimate. We show that, while higher costs are associated with slower growth in employment and
productivity in the registered manufacturing sector, this association is more muted - or even in the
opposite direction - in the unregistered manufacturing sector, where the regulations are less salient.
This suggests that the costs we estimate may play a role in the “informalization” of the Indian
economy, by pushing workers from the formal to the informal sector.
This paper aims to contribute to at least three important strands of literature. The first, which we
have already mentioned, is the literature on misallocation of resources and total factor productivity
(TFP), as exemplified by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Our contribution is to provide direct evidence
that at least some of the misallocation of resources across firms in India is tied to regulations or the
enforcement thereof.10 In particular, we show that size-based regulations (or at least the ways in
which they are enforced) lead firms to fall short of their optimal scale, thus distorting the allocation
of labor among firms in the economy and, likely, lowering TFP.
Another strand of literature to which we aim to contribute relates to corruption in the enforce-
ment of government policies. Most previous studies (eg: Besley and McLaren (1993); Mookherjee
at the state level, one might expect the two measures to be correlated.
8These corruption measures include a subjective, perceptions-based measured of corruption from Transparency In-
ternational and a measure of the percentage of electricity that is lost in transmission and distribution as reported by the
Reserve Bank of India (this latter measure has been used as a proxy for government corruption and ineffectiveness in, for
example, Kochhar et al, 2006).
9We measure “regulatory dependence” by taking the industry average of the number of inspector visits among Indian
firms in the 2005 World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
10In future work we hope to determine what portion of the TFP loss from misallocation estimated by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) can be attributed to the regulations we study.
4and Png (1995)) have modeled such corruption as collusion between inspectors and firms or citizens:
corrupt inspectors allow firms to avoid the de jure costs of abiding by regulations in exchange for
bribes. Hence, in these frameworks, corruption lowers the costs associated with regulations. How-
ever, there is a growing literature that contrasts collusionary corruption with extortionary corruption,
the latter occuring when corrupt inspectors have the ability to over report regulatory infringements
(eg: Mishra and Mookherjee (2013)). Since our results suggest that the costs associated with size-
based regulations are higher in more corrupt environments, they are thus more in line with this
alternative framework in which corruption takes the form of extortion between inspectors and firms
(i.e.: corrupt inspectors take advantage of bureacratic regulations in order to extract higher rents
from firms in the form of harassment bribes).11 We present a simple model of extortionary vs col-
lusive corruption that can explain the patterns we see in the data and provide additional support
for our interpretation through anecdotal evidence from “ipaidabribe.com”. We view the support we
provide for this alternative conception of corruption to be another contribution of the paper.
Lastly, this paper is also clearly related to the large literature that more generally investigates
the impact of Indian labor regulations on economic outcomes. The literature dates back to at least
Fallon and Lucas (1993), but the more recent proliferation seems to be due to the work of Besley
and Burgess (2004). In that paper, the authors first interpret state-level amendments to the Industrial
Disputes Act (IDA) as either “pro-worker” or “pro-employer” and then aim to show that Indian
states that amended the IDA in a “pro-worker” direction experienced slower growth in output, em-
ployment, investment and productivity in registered manufacturing. The paper, though extremely
influential, has been criticized by Bhattacharjea (2006) and Bhattacharjea (2009) on a number of
grounds. One of Bhattacharjea’s major criticisms is that Besley and Burgess’s interpretations of
amendments as “pro” or “anti-worker” are subjective and debatable (ie: different people might read
and code them in a different way). This criticism affects most of the subsequent academic work
on this topic, since most papers use the Besley-Burgess codings, but it is a criticism we are able
11This finding echoes Sequeira and Djankov (2014), who find evidence of extortionary bribery at South African ports,
and Novosad and Asher (2014), who argue that regulations can provide a means through which politicians can impose
costs on businesses.
5to sidestep with our methodology. Since our analysis is based only on firm level data and size-
thresholds stated explicitly in the laws themselves, it has the advantage of objectivity.
The second contribution we make to this literature is to focus on a set of regulations that have
been almost entirely ignored even though they effect a much larger proportion of firms than Chapter
VB of the IDA.12 For example, one recent paper, ?, also looks for (though it does not find) distortions
in the firm size distribution in India occuring at regulatory thresholds, but they too focus on the 100
worker threshold. The only other papers of which we are aware that study regulations that kick in at
the 10-worker threshold are Dougherty (2009), Dougherty et al. (2014) and Kanbur and Chatterjee
(2013). The latter investigates the Factories Act, which applies to all manufacturing firms that
use power and have 10 or more workers (or don’t use power and have 20 or more workers), but
their focus is to document non-compliance under the act, which we see as complementary to our
approach of estimating the costs of the regulations.13 Dougherty (2009) and Dougherty et al. (2014)
employ state-level indices of labor reforms that differ from the Besley-Burgess codes in that they
include consideration of non-IDA regulations such as the Factories Act, but they are constructed
from surveys of industry experts and, as such, are by and large subject to similar concerns regarding
subjectivity.
Another way in which we distinguish ourselves from the previous literature on Indian regula-
tions is that we explore the effect of regulations in all non-farm segments of the Indian economy -
not just in registered manufacturing, on which nearly all previous academic studies have focused. A
final contribution of the paper is to provide suggestive evidence that improper government enforce-
ment of regulations may play a role in shifting employment from the registered to the unregistered
sector.
In the next section (Section 1.2), we provide an overview of the relevant institutional details
12Chapter VB of the IDA only applies to manufacturing firms with 100 or more workers. In contrast, the regulations
we study affect all firms with 10 or more workers and are thus relevant for a much larger share of firms. We have also
tried analyzing Chapter VB of the IDA using the same methodology we employ for the regulations with the 10 worker
threshold, but find no effects. I.e.: there does not seem to be a proportional decrease in the density of establishments with
more than 100 workers. We also fail to observe “bunching” of firms at sizes just below 100, although the presence of
rounding may make such bunching impossible to discern even if it exists.
13In Section 1.4.4 we argue that our estimated costs are robust to the possibility of noncompliance.
6regarding Indian labor and industrial regulations. Section 1.3 introduces the data and covers some
basics about the size distribution of enterprises in India. In Section 1.4 we go over the theoretical
model and our corresponding empirical strategy. Section 3.14.2 provides the main results. In Sec-
tion 1.6, we interpret the findings, explore the multiple dimensions of variation in our results, and
investigate the connection between our estimated costed and corruption. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background: Size-Based Regulations in India
In this paper we attempt to investigate the effects of certain size-based industrial and labor regu-
lations in India. These are regulations that only apply to establishments that exceed a certain size,
measured either in terms of a firm’s revenue, the amount of fixed capital invested, or the number of
workers employed. One of the most significant such thresholds occurs when establishments employ
10 or more workers, after which they must register with the government and meet various workplace
safety requirements (under the Factories Act14, for example), pay social security taxes (under the
Employees’ State Insurance Act), distribute gratuities (under the Payment of Gratuity Act) and bear
a greater administrative burden (under, e.g., the Labor Laws Act).
Not only are the laws numerous, it has been argued that certain components of the laws are
antiquated and/or arbitrary. For example we read in the “India Labour Report” that “Rules under
the Factories Act, framed in 194815, provide for white washing of factories. Distemper won’t do.
Earthen pots filled with water are required. Water coolers won’t suffice. Red-painted buckets filled
with sand are required. Fire extinguishers won’t do... And so on” TeamLease Services (2006).
Firm owners who choose not to comply with such regulations may face costs if discovered and
convicted.16
In addition to - or in lieu of - the explicit costs of complying with the regulations, establishments
with 10 or more workers may be subject to implicit costs associated with increased interaction
14Technically the Factories Act applies for 10-plus worker establishments only if they use power. For establishments
that do not use power, the Factories Act does not apply until they employ 20 workers.
15The Factories Act itself dates to 1948, but the origins of the law go back another 100 years at least, to Britain’s first
Factory Acts.
16These costs may include fines and/or prison sentences.
7with labor inspectors, et al, who may have the power to extract bribes and tighten (or ease) the
administrative burden firms face. Indeed, inspectors in India have a large amount of discretion
regarding the enforcement of administrative law. For example, in some cases, the definition of what
constitutes a “day” is at the discretion of the inspector, and it is a commonly held view that “[w]hile
grave violations are ignored, minor errors become a scope for harassment” (TeamLease Services
(2006)).
This kind of behaviour has been referred to as “harassment bribery” (Basu (2011)). Anecdo-
tal evidence of inspectors using the complexity and sheer amount of paperwork as a way to ex-
tract bribes is easy to come by. For example, we have included a selection of citizen reports from
“ipaidabribe.com” in Appendix 2, which demonstrate just this kind of behaviour.17 Interestingly,
some of the reports suggest that the size of the bribe paid is a direct linear function of the number
of employees - which will be relevant to our estimation procedure later.
As we alluded to earlier, the 10 worker threshold is not the only one relevant; there are other
cutoffs at which different regulations become binding. For example, the threshold that seems to
have received the most attention, both from academics and the press, is that of 100 workers, at which
enterprises in most states become subject to Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, under which
they must be granted government permission to lay off workers. There are other cutoffs still,18 but in
this paper we will focus on estimating some of the costs and effects associated with the regulations
that come into force at the 10 worker cutoff. One important limitation of our analysis is that we will
not be able to address issues regarding the efficacy of any regulations in promoting worker welfare.
17We thank Andrew Foster for this suggestion.
18For example, firms with 20 or more workers must abide by the Provident Funds Act. Firms with 50 or more workers
must comply with Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, which requires them to provide compensation and notice to
employees prior to lay-offs.
81.3 Data and the Size Distribution in India
1.3.1 Data
The data we rely on to investigate the 10-worker threshold comes from the Economic Census (EC)
of India. The EC is meant to be a complete enumeration of all (formal and informal) non-farm
business establishments19 in India at a given time, regardless of their size. It is this last clause that
makes the EC different from every other data source available and precisely suited to our needs.
Although the 2005 dataset contains a large number of observations (almost 42 million), there is
not very detailed information collected on each observation. For each establishment in the data,
there is only information on a handful of variables including the total number of workers usually
working, the number of non-hired workers (such as family members working alongside the owner),
the registration status, the 4-digit NIC industry code, the type of ownership (private, government,
etc) and the source of funds for the establishment. There is no information on capital, output or
profits, and the data is cross-sectional.
The EC has rarely been used in academic papers - possibly because it is cross-sectional, con-
tains a significant amount of measurement error, and only contains information on the handful of
variables just enumerated, so that better data sources exist for most purposes. The EC is ideal for our
purpose, however, since it includes information on employment size and covers the entire universe
of establishments. Other more commonly used datasets, such as the CMIE’s Prowess Database, the
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) or the National Sample Survey’s (NSS) Unorganized Manufac-
turing Surveys cover only certain parts of the distribution and thus cannot be used for our purpose.
The ASI, for example, only covers factories in the manufacturing sector that have registered with
the government under the Factories Act. However, registration under this Act is only required for
establishments with 10 or more workers if the unit uses power (20 or more workers if the factory
19The EC refers to these as “entreprenuerial units” and defines them as any unit “engaged in the production or dis-
tribution of goods or services other than for the sole purpose of own consumption.” As is common in the literature, we
occasionally refer to them as “firms” even though the unit of observation in the data is actually a factory or an estab-
lishment, rather than a firm (i.e.: multiple establishments may belong to the same firm). We do this for expositional
purposes and justify our use of this convention with the observation that the proportion of establishments that belong to
multi-establishment firms is minute.
9Figure 1.1: Distribution of establishment size for establishments with 1-200 total workers, 2005
uses no power). Therefore, the selection of the ASI varies discontinuously at precisely the point of
interest. Similar limitations on coverage make the other datasets - other than the EC - unsuitable.
Aside from the Economic Census, we also supplement our analysis with data from a variety of
other sources. From the ASI we get employment and productivity in the registered manufacturing
sector. We generate those same variables for the unregistered sector with data from the Ministry of
Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We get
data on state and industry level corruption from a) Transparency International’s “India Corruption
Study 2005”, b) the RBI, and c) the World Bank Enterprise Survey for India (2005). Data on
State-level regulatory enforcement come from the Indian Labour Year Book.20 Other measures of
state-level regulations come from Aghion et al. (2008) and Dougherty (2009), while industry-level
measures of exposure to trade liberalization come from Ahsan and Mitra (2014).
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of establishment size for establishments with 5-25 total workers, 2005
1.3.2 The Size Distribution of Establishments in India
Figure 1.1 below shows the distribution of establishments by the number of total workers (hired
and non-hired workers) for establishments with up to 200 total workers in 2005. Perhaps the most
striking feature of figure 1.1 is the extraordinary degree to which the distribution is right-skewed.
Indeed, about half of all establishments are single person enterprises, while the densities for estab-
lishments with 10 or more workers are almost imperceptible.21 Figure 1.2 shows the drop in density
for establishments with 10 or more workers in detail and figure 1.3 shows the full distribution of
establishment size frequencies according to a log scale. Each point represents one bar in the earlier
histograms.
Two things are most striking about figure 1.3. First, the natural log of the density is a linear
function of the natural log of the number of total workers. This implies that the unlogged distribution
follows an inverse power law in the number of total workers. This pattern will be important for the
analysis that follows but it is not very surprising in and of itself: power law distributions in firm sizes
have been documented in many countries (e.g. Axtell (2001) and Herna´ndez-Pe´rez et al. (2006)).
20We would like to thank Anushree Sinha and Avantika Prabhakar for their considerable and generous help in obtaining
these data.
21The densities for establishments with more than 200 workers are also imperceptible. We have omitted them only for
clarity in the figure.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of establishment size, 2005, log scale
The second and more unique feature of the distribution is that there appears to be a level shift
downward in the log frequency for establishment sizes greater than or equal to 10. Figure 1.4 shows
this effect for establishments with fewer than 100 workers by running an OLS regression of the log
density against log firm size and allowing the intercept to vary for firms with 10 or more workers.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to document this phenomenon in India.
Also of note from the figures above is that there appears to be a significant amount of non-
classical measurement error, seemingly due to rounding of establishment sizes to multiples of 5
and 10. The existence of rounding is not surprising given that the data are self-reported and that
respondents are asked to give the “number of persons usually working [over the last year]”. Partially
to alleviate concerns that the non-classical measurement error due to rounding might bias our results
(and partially for other reasons to be made explicit shortly), we will employ an estimation procedure
which first smooths the data non-parametrically.
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Figure 1.4: Downward shift at the 10-worker threshold in the distribution of establishment size,
2005, log scale (omitting establishments with more than 100 workers)
1.4 Model and Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Basic Model
To interpret the downward shift from Figure 1.4 in economic terms, we turn to the model in GLV.
In their framework, size-based regulations are assumed to increase the unit labor costs of firms that
exceed the size threshold, which results in a downshift in part of the theoretical firm size distribution.
From the magnitude of the downshift they observe in the empirical distribution they attempt to
estimate the additional labor costs imposed by the regulations.
GLV begin with a distribution of managerial ability (a⇠ f(a)) as the primitive object, following
Lucas (1978). As is common in the literature (e.g. Eaton, 2011), they assume that the distribution
of managerial ability follows a power law (e.g. f(a) = caa ba). It is this that will generate a power
law in the theoretical firm size distribution. A firm with productivity or managerial ability a faces
the following profit-maximization problem:
p(a) =max
n
a f (n) wt¯n
where n is the number of workers a firm employs, f (n) is a production function (with f 0(n)> 0
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and f 00(n) < 0), w is a constant wage paid to all workers, and t¯ is a proportional tax on labor that
takes the value 1 if n N and t if n> N, where t> 1.
From the first order condition on this maximization problem, a= wt
f 0 (n) , one can see that higher
productivity establishments/managers will employ more workers, and that firms which cross the
threshold (N) and must therefore pay higher labor costs will hire fewer workers than they would
otherwise. This latter feature is built to match the observed “downshift” in the actual firm size
distribution to the right of the regulatory threshold.
One can informally characterize the solution as follows: one set of managers with particularly
low productivity (below some threshold a1) will be effectively unconstrained. These managers
would have chosen to hire fewer than 10 workers whether or not the regulation was present. Another
set of managers with slightly higher productivity (between some thresholds a1 and a2) would, in
the absence of the regulation, have chosen to hire 10 or more workers - but who, in the presence
of the regulation, obtain higher profits by hiring only 9 workers to avoid the discontinuous increase
in costs implied by crossing the threshold. These mangers should be “bunched up” at 9. The last
set of managers are those with high enough productivity (a> a2) that it is not worth it to avoid the
regulation and so they choose to exceed the threshold and pay the tax. However, these managers face
higher marginal costs than they would in the absence of the regulation and therefore employ fewer
workers by a constant proportion (resulting in a “downshift” in the logged firm size distribution).
An exact expression for the distribution of firm size, c(n), can be recovered as a transforma-
tion of the distribution of managerial ability, f(a), since the first-order conditions on the firms’
maximization problems imply a monotonic relationship between a and n. The key result is that a
function of the tax enters multiplicatively in the expression for the density of firms size n (for all n>
9). Therefore, the function of the tax enters additively in the log density for all firms large enough
to be subject to the tax.
Formally, the density of firms with n total workers, c(n) is given by:
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c(n) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
  1 q
q
 1 b
(b 1)n b i f n 2 [nmin,N) 1 q
q
 1 b
(N1 b  t  b 11 q n1 bu ) i f n= N
0 i f n 2 (N,nu)  1 q
q
 1 b
(b 1)t  b 11 q n b i f n  nu
where q measures the degree of diminishing returns to scale, capturing both features of the
production function and market power, b represents the negative slope of the power law and t is the
implicit per worker tax. Taking logs and combining the first and last cases22 leads to:
log(c(n)) = log
"✓
1 q
q
◆1 b
(b 1)
#
 b log(n)+ log(t  b 11 q )1{n> 9}
This leads to an estimating equation:
log(c(n)) = a b log(n)+d1{n> 9} (1.1)
We can identify t according to:
t= exp(d) 
1 q
b 1
t is thus a function of q,b and d. We get estimates for a,b and d from equation 1.1. Knowing a and
b pins down q, which allows us to identify t.
1.4.2 Concerns Regarding Misreporting
Before proceeding further, we must consider how our results might be affected by the possibility of
misreporting. This is important because one of the underlying assumptions of the analysis above is
that the size distribution of firms as observed in the Economic Census is accurate. However, since
the data are self-reported, it is possible that plant managers may misreport information to Economic
Census enumerators. Specifically, if the managers are aware of the increased regulatory burden that
22In other words, we ignore the bunching at N and the valley directly after, since these are features that are not easily
observable in the data. Instead we focus on the ranges n 2 [nmin,N) and n> nu.
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is associated with employing 10 or more workers, and if they believe that the EC enumerators will
relay information to government regulatory bodies, they may wish to hide the fact that their actual
employment exceeds the threshold. To see how this type of behavior might affect our results, we
model it explicitly in the following subsection.
A further reason to be concerned about the possibility of misreporting is due to the fact that
Economic Census enumerators were required to fill out an extra form containing the address of any
establishment that reported 10 or more workers. It is conceivable that enumerators might have found
it preferable to under-report the number of workers for establishments with 10 or more workers in
order to avoid the extra burden of filling in the “Address Slip”. Although we do not model this type
of problem explicitly in what follows, the implications are nearly identical to those of the model we
do explicitly analyze.23
1.4.3 A Theoretical Model of Misreporting
Our model of misreporting starts with the theoretical model from Section 1.4.1, and amends it to
allow firms to choose not only their true employment (n), but also their reported employment (l).
Then, a firm with productivity a faces the following profit-maximization problem:
p(a) =max
n,l
a f (n) wn  tl ⇤1(l > 9) F(n, l)⇤ p(n, l)
where a, f (n),w and t are all defined as they were previously. The problem is identical except
that now firms pay the extra marginal cost, t, only on their reported employment, and not on their
true employment. Furthermore, they only pay this cost if their reported employment exceeds the
threshold.24 There is now an incentive for firms to misreport their employment in a downward
direction (i.e.: to set l < n). Counteracting this incentive is that misreporting firms may be caught
by the authorities with probability p(n, l), and made subject to a fine, F(n, l). As written above,
23The only difference is that higher fixed costs would replace higher marginal costs. It is, moreover, easy to show that
if our estimation strategy is robust to the model of misreporting we do analyze, it is also robust to this second type of
misreporting as well.
24In point of fact it is most likely that firms’ answers to Economic Census enumerators have no impact on their
regulatory burden, but it is possible that firms believe otherwise, and that is what is relevant.
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both the probability of being caught and the magnitude of the fine may in general depend on n and
l in an arbitrary way. However, if one is willing to make the assumption that the expected cost of
misreporting (F ⇤ p) is an increasing and convex function of the degree of misreporting, n  l, it
will be possible to use an estimation technique that will be only minimally biased by the presence
of misreporting. Fortunately, based on our understanding of the context in which firms make these
decisions,25 we believe that this is the most reasonable assumption on the functional form of the
expected cost that one could make.
One plausible way to obtain convex misreporting costs is to suppose that firms are caught with
a probability that is linearly increasing in the degree of their misreporting (i.e.: n  l) and subject to
a fine if caught which is also a linear function of their misreporting. Another possibility is that the
probability of being caught is itself an increasing and convex function of the degree of misreporting
and the fine if caught is fixed. In what follows we will assume the latter for clarity of exposition,
but the analysis is identical for any assumption that yields convex costs of misreporting.
Specifically, suppose that misreporting firms are caught with probability p(n, l) = (n l)
2
100 , and
pay a fixed fine, F , if caught. Then their profit maximization problem is:
p(a) =max
n,l
a f (n) wn  tl ⇤1(l > 9) F ⇤ (n  l)
2
100
The solution to this problem can be informally characterized as follows. The lowest productivity
firms (those with a below some threshold, a1) will be unconstrained, choosing n 9 and reporting
truthfully (l = n). Higher productivity firms, with a 2 [a1,a2], will choose n > 9, exceeding the
regulatory threshold, but will find it profitable to misreport their employment, setting l = 9. These
firms will only appear to be “bunched” up at 9, but will in fact have higher employment. The last
category of firms are those with a> a2, which are productive enough to warrant hiring work forces
so large that they cannot avoid detection with reasonable probability and must report l > 9. Even
these firms, however, with both n> 9 and l > 9 do not find it profit-maximizing to report truthfully.
25This understanding is informed by informal interviews with small businesses in Chennai and our reading of the
secondary literature.
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They can save on their unit labor costs by shading their reported employment, and will choose
l = n  50F t. Note that the degree of misreporting is by a constant amount, rather than a constant
proportion.26
More formally, the log of the density of firms with true employment n, logc(n), is given by:
logc(n) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
logA blog(n) i f n 2 [nmin,9)
log[x(n)] i f n 2 [9,nm(a2)]
0 i f n 2 (nm(a2),nt(a2))
logA0(t) blog(n) i f n  nt(a2)
while the log of the density of firms with reported employment l, logy(l) is given by:
logy(l) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
logA blog(l) i f l 2 [lmin,9)
log(dl) i f l = 9
0 i f n 2 (9, lt(a2))
logA0(t) blog(l+ 50F t) i f l   lt(a2)
where terms have been simplified and collected.27 Both of these densities are graphically rep-
resented in Figure 1.5 under specific values of the parameters (the true distribution, c(n), is repre-
sented by a thick line, and the reported distribution, y(l), is in blue). The key things to note are
the following. First, for the range l  9, the true distribution coincides with the reported/observed
distribution. Second, there appears to be bunching at 9 in the reported distribution, but these firms in
fact have greater than 9 workers. Third, compared to the distribution for n< 9, the true distribution
and the reported distribution for n  10 are downshifted (A0(t) < A), just as was the case in the
model without misreporting.28 Fourth - and most significantly - the reported distribution converges
to the true distribution for large l: lim
l!•
blog(l+ 50F t) blog(l)! 0. This is due to the fact that the
misreporting is by a constant amount (as noted earlier), rather than by a constant proportion.
To conclude this subsection on the theoretical implications of allowing for misreporting, we
make two observations. First, misreporting may lead us to observe “bunching” in the firm size
26This outcome is a result of the convex cost assumption.
27Derivation to be added in an appendix.
28As before, the downshift is a function of t.
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Figure 1.5: Theoretical Model of Misreporting, log scale (thick line = true distribution; thin line =
reported distribution; dashed line = counterfactual distribution)
2 5 10 20 50 100
0.001
0.002
0.005
0.010
0.020
0.050
0.100
0.200
distribution when in reality there may be none. This is irrelevant for us since our estimation strategy
does not rely on the bunching in any way. Second, misreporting may lead the reported/observed
distribution to understate the true distribution close to the cutoff. However, because the reported
distribution converges to the true distribution for large l/n, misreporting is not able to induce a
downshift in the reported distribution that differs from the downshift in the true distribution at large
values of l. Therefore, if we use an estimation strategy that focuses mostly on values far from
the cutoff, our estimate of the downshift using the observed distribution is likely to reflect the real
downshift and thus we are likely to avoid this source of bias. We develop such an estimation strategy
in the following subsection.
Before proceeding, however, we should note again that the above analysis assumes that the
expected costs of misreporting are strictly convex. There exist non-convex functional forms of the
cost function which may lead one to observe a downshift in the reported distribution that is greater
than the one in the true distribution, thus biasing any estimates of t upwards.
1.4.4 An Empirical Strategy Robust to the Possibility of Misreporting
Since convex misreporting costs imply that misreporting will only distort the distribution of reported
establishment size versus the true distribution of establishment size close to the cutoff, we estimate
the model on the full distribution of establishment size. Since estimating equation 1.1 treats each
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establishment size as one observation, using the full distribution of establishment size will mean that
the model is primarily estimated using data far from the 10-worker cutoff.29 However, estimating
equation 1.1 on the full distribution of establishment size introduces two complications. First, we
cannot perform the estimation on the empirical PMF for large firm sizes, since the empirical proba-
bility mass is truncated at the reciprocal of the number of observations (see figure 1.6 below), while
the underlying density continues to diminish in establishment size. Second, respondents appear to
round their reported number of workers to the nearest multiple of 5 (see figure 1.2), a phenomenon
that is more pronounced for larger establishments and that could bias our results.
Figure 1.6: Downward shift at the 10-worker threshold in the distribution of establishment size
estimated on nonparametric density estimates, 2005, log scale (including all establishments). Black
points = actual data; Grey = smoothed data.
To address these two problems, we first estimate the density associated with each number of
workers c(n) non-parametrically using the method of Markovitch and Krieger (2000), which ad-
dresses the econometric issues arising in nonparametric density estimation of heavy-tailed data. We
then use the nonparametric density estimates as a basis for fitting the model in equation 1.1, aug-
mented by dummy variables for having 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 - 20 workers.30 Figure 1.6 depicts the
29The largest establishment in the 2005 EC has 22,901 workers.
30The rationale for flexibly modeling the density at 1 and 2 workers is that own account enterprises and 2-worker
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strategy. The black dots show the raw data. The grey dots represent the result of the first step: non-
parametric density estimates associated with each establishment size. The line shows the fit of the
model in equation 1.1, augmented by the dummy variables, to the nonparametric density estimates.
Figure 1.6 above provides some evidence for the model described in section 1.4.3. The observed
establishment size distribution appears to converge back to a power law with the same slope as for
establishments with fewer than 10 workers, but deviates slightly from that slope at sizes just above
the 10-worker cutoff. In the next section we report the results of the estimation.
1.5 Results
In this section we apply the estimation procedure described above to the 2005 Economic Census of
India and report the results. Standard errors obtained from a wild cluster bootstrap procedure with
200 replications are given in parentheses.31 In the tables below, we first report estimates for t  1
at the All-India level and for a selection of States, Industries and Ownership Types. Estimates for
all States, Industries and Ownership Types are reported in the Appendix. The All-India estimate on
t 1 is .35 and is statistically significant. This means that, on average, establishments in India that
hire more than 9 workers act as though they must pay additional labor costs of 35% of the wage
per additional worker. In the tables and figures it can be seen that there is substantial variation in
the magnitude of our estimates of the per-worker tax by State, Industry and Ownership Type. For
example, the point estimate on t 1 for the State of Kerala is .14, while the estimate for Bihar, on
the other hand, is .70, implying that establishments in Bihar act as though they must pay a tax of
70% of the wage for each additional worker they hire past 9 workers.
We also observe substantial differences in the size of t by industry: it appears that the effective
tax is highest for establishments in construction and retail. As one might expect, the tax is nonex-
enterprises are likely to be household enterprises and may therefore differ fundamentally in character from their larger
counterparts. The rationale for flexibly modeling the density at 8 and 9 workers is that the theory above predicts that
the reported density just below the cutoff will be biased upwards by any misreporting effects. Similarly, the theory also
predicts that values above - but close to - the threshold may also be biased (downwards). Therefore we also flexibly
control for such values (10 to 20) as well, although doing so has only a very small effect on the estimates: as explained
above, the estimates are driven mostly by observations relatively far from the threshold.
31We cluster at the firm size level to allow for the possibility that reporting errors may be correlated by firm size.
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istent for establishments in the public administration sector (in fact it is negative, but this seems to
result from the fact that the assumed power law does not fit the distribution of establishments in this
sector well). Similarly, when looking at the differences by ownership type, we find that the estimates
for t are highest for private firms (especially unincorporated proprietorships), and nonexistent (or
negative) for government-owned firms, where presumably the regulatory burden is less than in the
private sector.
Estimates of t by State Using the Full Distribution of Establishment Size
Level t 1
All-India
.347
(0.059)
By State
Bihar .693
(0.069)
Gujarat 0.165
(0.047)
Kerala 0.138
(0.033)
Uttar Pradesh 0.502
(0.069)
By Industry
Construction .478
(0.047)
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Manufacturing .268
(0.039)
Wholesale, retail .637
(0.115)
Public admin., social security -.311
(0.031)
By Ownership Type
Government and PSU -.092
(0.028)
Unincorporated Proprietary .490
(0.005)
1.6 Discussion and Investigation of Mechanisms
1.6.1 Interpretation of Results
Thus far we have argued that the observed downshift in the distribution of establishments with 10
or more workers is related to the existence of certain labor and industrial regulations that become
binding at that point. But if the regulations are responsible for the observed effect, then differences
in the substance or application of the regulations should explain (at least part of) the great variation
we observe across States and Industries.32 In this section we explore these dimensions of variation
32The variation across ownership types is straightforward to explain: the regulations are clearly not applied in the
same way to privately owned enterprises and government enterprises. An additional explanation is that government
establishments are not profit maximizing and thus would require a different motivational theory altogether to produce the
observed power law distribution.
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with the goal of reaching a deeper understanding regarding the causes and consequences of the
costs we have tried to estimate. The regressions we do are cross-sectional and the variables used
are endogenous, so the results cannot be given a causal interpretation, but we find them instructive
nevertheless.
To preview our results, we do observe a correlation between our estimated costs (t) and cer-
tain measures of the substance of the regulations. Moreover, we also find a robust and indepen-
dent correlation between our estimated costs and several different measures of corruption/poor state
governance, suggesting that it is not only the regulations themselves but also their enforcement and
application that is responsible for the high costs we estimate. We also sketch a theoretical frame-
work of bribery and extortion which casts light on the proper interpretation of our empirical results.
Finally, we present some suggestive evidence that our costs may have significant negative dynamic
implications, as they are associated with lower growth in employment and productivity in registered
manufacturing - and higher growth in employment in unregistered manufacturing.
1.6.2 t and Corruption: Evidence from the Interstate Variation
We start by regressing our state-level estimates of t against other established measures of the regu-
latory environment (see Table 1.2).33 These measures include the “Besley Burgess” (BB) measure
of labor regulations from Aghion et al. (2008) and several measures from Dougherty (2009). The
first is a measure of the number of amendments that a state government has made to the Indus-
trial Disputes Act in either a “pro-worker” or “pro-employer” direction, as interpreted by Aghion
et al. (2008), who update the measure to include amendments up to 1997.34 Positive values indicate
more “pro-worker” amendments, which are assumed to imply a more restrictive environment for
firms operating in those states. Dougherty (2009) also provides state level measures that reflect “the
extent to which procedural or administrative changes have reduced transaction costs in relation to
labor issues” Dougherty et al. (2014). Higher values therefore indicate an improved environment
33Note that the estimates of t we use in all the analysis below were generated using the procedure in Section 1.4.4 that
we have argued is robust to possible misreporting and non-classical measurement error.
34Since there have been few state-level amendments to the IDA between 1997 and 2005, this measure should be largely
the same in 2005.
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for firms. Dougherty’s measures are unique in that they cover a wide range of labor-related issues -
not just the IDA. In the analysis below, we will focus on measures from Dougherty (2009) that cover
reforms regarding 1) the Factories Act and 2) an overall measure of reforms. All relevant variables
in our analysis have been rescaled to have mean zero and standard deviation one, with the goal of
allowing comparability between regression coefficients in different specifications.
In Table 1.2, correlations are reported between t and the three measures both by themselves and
while controlling for other factors (notably state GDP per capita and the state’s share of employ-
ment in manufacturing). The Besley Burgess (BB) measure does not seem to be correlated with t
(although our power is limited by the very small number of observations) while the two measures
from Dougherty (2009) are significantly correlated after applying controls (though not all the corre-
lations are strongly significant) and have the “correct” sign: states that saw more “transaction cost
reducing” reforms have lower ts. 35 On the one hand the lack of correlation between t and the
BB measure is not surprising, as the latter capture variation only due to state amendments to the
Industrial Disputes Act, which does not vary over the ten person threshold. On the other hand, if
the Besley Burgess measure is meant to capture the general regulatory environment (which is how
it is used in countless studies), we might well expect it to correlate with our measure of regulatory
costs. That the correlation does not hold may therefore be of interest.
While the prediction regarding the correlation between t and BB 97 may be ambiguous, that is
not the case for Dougherty’s measures of transaction-cost reducing reforms related to the Factories
Act. We should expect our measure of t to correlate negatively with the latter, since the Factories
Act does vary across the 10 worker threshold, and indeed we see that it does. t is also correlated
with Dougherty’s more comprehensive measure of reforms, one which aggregates reforms across
all areas, although it does not appear to correlate with any other subcomponents (which are not
depicted here).
35In this and most of the analysis ahead, we focus on the 18 largest Indian States, for which data are most consistently
available and which offer the most precise estimates of t (the power law relationship breaks down in smaller states when
there are not enough observations).
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Table 1.2: Tau vs Other Measures of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
Besley-Burgess -0.0734 -0.00841 0.0481
measure (regs) (0.204) (0.192) (0.172)
Dougherty measure -0.289 -0.407⇤⇤ -0.408⇤
(all reforms) (0.201) (0.174) (0.198)
Dougherty measure -0.211 -0.318⇤ -0.304
(FA reforms) (0.187) (0.166) (0.181)
log of net state -0.432⇤ -0.592⇤⇤ -0.604⇤⇤ -0.575⇤⇤ -0.590⇤⇤ -0.605⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.226) (0.214) (0.206) (0.241) (0.217) (0.257)
share of employment -3.490 2.657 3.899 2.962 3.486 4.215
in manufacturing (4.886) (5.090) (3.281) (4.934) (3.435) (5.163)
share of privately -11.66 2.003 0.529
owned establishments (6.768) (5.895) (6.221)
share of registered 3.042⇤ -0.0440 0.654
establishments (1.530) (1.476) (1.469)
Constant 0.641⇤⇤⇤ 5.315⇤⇤ 15.79⇤⇤ 0.653⇤⇤⇤ 6.207⇤⇤⇤ 4.259 0.631⇤⇤⇤ 6.091⇤⇤ 5.481
(0.204) (2.165) (6.707) (0.187) (1.962) (6.113) (0.189) (2.068) (6.517)
Observations 15 15 15 18 18 18 18 18 18
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States
In addition to the above measures regarding state-level changes to the statutory, procedural
and administrative aspects of the regulations, we also regress t against certain other measures of
the labor environment. Table 1.3 reports the results of t regressed against per capita measures of
strikes, man-days lost to strikes, lockouts and man-days lost to lockouts. One might imagine that
strikes and lockouts capture relevant features of the regulatory and labor environment,36 but we do
not find them to be robustly correlated with t.
36For example, some industrial regulations explicitly undermine or support the rights of parties to engage in strikes or
lockouts.
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One might also expect t to be correlated with aspects of the regulatory enforcement. To test
this hypothesis we regress t against state level variables related to enforcement such as the number
of inspections, convictions, and fines levied under various regulations.37 The results of the regres-
sions for a subset of the enforcement related variables are shown in Table 1.4. In short, the only
enforcement variable that is even close to being significantly correlated with t is the percentage of
factories registered under the Factories Act that have been inspected. However, as can be seen from
the table, the enforcement data are only available for a small subset of the major states, leaving very
little power in the regressions. Furthermore, the regressions shown exclude Uttar Pradesh, which is
a substantial outlier in the enforcement data.
37These data were obtained from the 2005 Indian Labour Yearbook, which we were able to attain with the generous
help of Anushree Sinha and Avantika Prabhakar of NCAER.
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Table 1.3: Tau vs Strikes and Lockouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
strikes per capita -0.272⇤ -0.196
(0.145) (0.148)
mandays lost due to -0.119 -0.148
strikes per capita (0.157) (0.159)
lockouts per capita -0.0544 -0.0915
(0.146) (0.143)
mandays lost due to -0.0527 -0.0995
lockouts per capita (0.145) (0.139)
log of net state -0.400 -0.493⇤ -0.506⇤⇤ -0.515⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.235)
share of employment 2.548 4.482 3.831 3.754
in manufacturing (3.644) (4.171) (3.995) (3.913)
Constant 0.721⇤⇤⇤ 4.352⇤ 0.646⇤⇤⇤ 5.017⇤⇤ 0.620⇤⇤⇤ 5.191⇤⇤ 0.618⇤⇤⇤ 5.291⇤⇤
(0.187) (2.204) (0.212) (2.272) (0.198) (2.221) (0.197) (2.222)
Observations 18 18 17 17 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 1.4: Tau vs Enforcement of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
percent of factories 0.448⇤
inspected (0.230)
convictions under FA -0.0914
per factory (0.411)
prosecutions under -0.122
SEA per capita (0.357)
fines under SEA per 0.323
capita (0.342)
prosecutions per -0.134
inspection (0.254)
fines per inspection 2.598
under SEA (3.557)
cases disposed per -9.616
inspection under SEA (16.45)
cases disposed per 1.058
cases prosecuted under SEA (1.094)
log of net state -0.0180 -0.648 -1.545⇤⇤ -2.220⇤⇤ -1.572⇤⇤ -1.977⇤⇤ -1.471⇤⇤ -1.610⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.921) (1.265) (0.606) (0.783) (0.537) (0.677) (0.600) (0.500)
share of employment -2.361 4.091 4.873 5.550 4.525 7.130 4.486 2.514
in manufacturing (7.120) (12.61) (4.855) (4.542) (4.883) (5.277) (4.848) (5.340)
Constant 0.970 6.706 15.42⇤⇤ 22.20⇤⇤ 15.72⇤⇤ 20.08⇤⇤ 12.60 16.57⇤⇤⇤
(8.791) (11.88) (5.835) (7.767) (5.150) (6.986) (8.218) (4.802)
Observations 10 9 13 13 13 13 13 13
Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States (except UP) for which data exist.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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To briefly summarize the results so far, when regressing t against regulatory substance, enforce-
ment or industrial disputes, one only observes correlations for certain specific types of measures of
those phenomena. In contrast, in our remaining analysis, we will demonstrate that our measures
of t are strongly and robustly correlated with corruption, almost regardless of how it is measured.
Table 1.5 reports the results of regressing t against corruption as measured in a 2005 Transparency
International (TI) Survey.38 Column 1 includes all states for which there is data, while the remain-
ing columns include only the 18 largest Indian states. Column 3 adds controls for state GDP per
capita, share of manufacturing in employment and some others, while Column 4 adds the aggregate
measure of regulatory reform from Dougherty (2009). With no exceptions, the coefficient on the TI
corruption score is consistently significant and very large in magnitude: a one standard deviation
increase in a state’s corruption score is associated with a .5 standard deviation increase in t. In
particular, the fact that the coefficient remains significant in Column 4 even after controlling for
Dougherty’s measure of regulatory reforms suggests that the relationship between t and corruption
is at least partly independent from the relationship with the regulations themselves.
In what follows we will use the TI corruption score as our primary measure of corruption. One
might be concerned, however, that the TI measure may be flawed as it is the result of individuals’
perceptions (it has been argued by some that the perception of corruption is an unreliable indicator
for actual corruption). Therefore, we also regress t against an alternative measure of corruption that
is not perception based to check for robustness of the relationship between t and corruption: Table
1.6 reports the results of t regressed against the percent of a state’s available electricity that was
lost in transmission and distribution in 2005. This variable has been used by other researchers as a
proxy for corruption and poor state governance, and has the virtue of being a concrete and objective
measure that does not depend on perceptions Kochhar et al. (2006). As with the TI Corruption
Score, the correlations between t and this alternative measure of corruption are significant and large
in magnitude regardless of sample or controls - including, again, the addition of the Dougherty
measure of regulatory reform in Column 4. To make sure that the results are not driven by the actual
38The TI corruption measure is based on a survey of perceptions and experience regarding corruption in the public
sector.
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transmission of electricity, we control for per capita electricity available in Column 5 - which does
not affect the results.
Table 1.5: Tau vs Transparency International Corruption Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tau tau tau tau
TI Corruption Score 0.422⇤⇤ 0.583⇤⇤⇤ 0.574⇤⇤⇤ 0.512⇤⇤⇤
(0.157) (0.145) (0.153) (0.139)
log of net state -0.381⇤ -0.446⇤⇤
domestic product pc (0.191) (0.172)
share of employment 7.362⇤ 6.444⇤
in manufacturing (4.007) (3.569)
share of privately -2.662 -2.057
owned establishments (4.805) (4.258)
share of registered 1.455 0.665
establishments (1.106) (1.048)
Dougherty measure -0.296⇤
(all reforms) (0.142)
Constant 0.557⇤⇤⇤ 0.644⇤⇤⇤ 5.494 5.976
(0.153) (0.138) (4.847) (4.291)
Observations 20 18 18 18
States Included All Major Major Major
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 1.6: Tau vs Transmission and Distribution Losses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tau tau tau tau tau
electricity 0.318⇤ 0.648⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤ 0.566⇤⇤ 0.708⇤⇤
transmission and distribution losses (0.165) (0.244) (0.253) (0.237) (0.268)
log of net state -0.477⇤ -0.536⇤⇤ -0.459⇤
domestic product pc (0.222) (0.205) (0.229)
share of employment 7.651 6.515 6.817
in manufacturing (4.812) (4.439) (5.094)
share of privately -2.148 -1.440 -1.980
owned establishments (5.677) (5.200) (5.824)
share of registered 1.513 0.644 1.577
establishments (1.307) (1.284) (1.343)
Dougherty measure -0.317⇤
(all reforms) (0.172)
Electricity 0.119
available (GWH) (0.182)
Constant -8.42e-09 0.643⇤⇤⇤ 5.936 6.322 5.610
(0.163) (0.163) (5.746) (5.253) (5.910)
Observations 35 18 18 18 18
States Included All Major Major Major Major
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
Although the state-level correlations between t and corruption appear to be robust, the regres-
sions lack exogenous variation and are subject to the concern that our measures of corruption may
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be correlated with omitted variables that are also correlated with t. To partially address these con-
cerns, we attempt to take advantage of State X Industry level heterogeneity. In particular, inspired
by Novosad and Asher (2014), we use 2005 World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data to create
an industry-level measure of “dependence on government bureaucracy”. Specifically, Indian firms
in the 2005 WBES were asked how many times in a year they had an inspection or other required
meeting with a government official. Averaging the firm-level responses by industry, we classify
industries according to their average number of visits with officials (i.e., their dependence on gov-
ernment bureaucracy). If some industries have more meetings with officials, and if corruption takes
place during some of these meetings, we would imagine that the costs of corruption would be high-
est for firms in those industries with the highest dependence on bureaucracy and in those states that
have the highest levels of corruption. That is, we would expect that the interaction between industry
level dependence on bureaucracy and state level corruption is positive. If found to be the case, it
would be harder to argue that the result is due to the presence of omitted variables.
The hypothesis is tested in Table 1.7. To do so we generate our measures of t at the State
X Industry level39 and interact each of our state level measures of corruption with a) the industry
average number of visits from officials and b) the industry average duration of visits from officials.
We include the interaction with average duration of visits as a placebo test: it is not clear that the
duration of an inspection should be positively or negatively correlated with corruption.40 We then
regress our State X Industry measures of t against the covariates including interaction terms. Our
prior is that the interaction of corruption with duration of visits should be less significant than the
interaction with number of visits. Indeed, this is mostly what we observe. The interaction between
our measures of corruption and the number of visits is at least weakly significant (at the 10% level)
for one of the two measures, while the interaction between corruption and average duration of visits
is never significant.
39Industries here are categorized according to their groupings in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, which distin-
guishes 24 distinct industry categories. Examples include “auto components”, “leather and leather products”, and “food
processing”.
40In particular, corruption may lead to longer inspections if the process of extracting the bribe takes time, or it may
lead to shorter inspections if corruption obviates the need to carry out the actual inspection.
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To summarize our results from these investigations, we find:
1. a correlation between t and certain aspects of the substance of regulations as measured in
Dougherty (2009),
2. a nonexistent or inconclusive relationship between t and measures of the labor environment
and enforcement of regulations, and
3. a strong and robust relationship between t and two distinct measures of corruption.
Although none of these results can be said to be causal, we find them suggestive of a relationship
between corruption and high labor costs. Next, we turn our attention to the question of how and
why greater corruption would lead to higher labor costs for firms. To this end, in the following
subsection we outline a simple theoretical framework to elucidate the potential connection.
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Table 1.7: Tau vs State Level Corruption Interacted with Industry Level “Dependence on Regula-
tion” (with Industry FEs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tau tau tau tau
2005 TI 0.132⇤ 0.140⇤
Corruption Score (0.0668) (0.0666)
electricity 0.0583 0.0493
transmission and distribution losses (0.114) (0.110)
number of 0.127 0.130
inspections (0.0829) (0.0945)
duration of -0.00610 -0.109
inspections (0.124) (0.143)
corruption score 0.101⇤
X num inspections (0.0545)
corruption score 0.0513
X duration of inspections (0.0691)
electricity TDLs 0.0112
X num of inspections (0.0848)
electricity TDLs -0.0698
X duration of inspections (0.107)
log of Net State -0.185⇤⇤⇤ -0.185⇤⇤⇤ -0.197⇤⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤
Domestic Product pc (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0428) (0.0427)
Constant -0.244 0.0235 -0.235 -0.217
(0.187) (0.442) (0.187) (0.498)
Observations 189 189 189 189
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors clustered at the State Level, Industry FEs included.
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1.6.2.1 A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Corruption Between Inspectors and
Firms
We find it helpful to distinguish between two types of corruption that could take place between
inspectors and firms: collusion and extortion. Collusion takes place when inspectors allow firms to
avoid the costs of complying with regulations in exchange for bribes. However, poor state gover-
nance (which here would imply an inability to control corruption) would then lead to lower costs
for firms, as greater corruption would make it easier to avoid the full costs of regulation.41 However,
what we observed in Section 1.6.2 was a robust positive correlation between effective costs (t) and
poor governance/corruption. To explain this phenomenon, we need a model of extortion. In this
section, we will sketch the intuition for such a model. A fuller (but still simple) model of extortion
and bribery is provided in Appendix 3.
Let us start with the observation that all firms reporting at least 10 employees fall under the
jurisdiction of certain regulations. Imagine, now, that the regulations are so complex so as to make
it impossible (or prohibitively costly) for any firm to be fully in compliance with all aspects of the
law as written.42 Then, an inspector can, at any time, choose to subject a firm under his jurisdic-
tion to a penalty e, which may include financial (e.g.: fines) and/or non-financial elements (e.g.:
harassment, time needed to defend claims of violations, etc). We can think of the extent of the
penalty (e) as a function of state governance: properly functioning governments hire and motivate
inspectors to pursue substantive violations rather than minor ones, while inspectors in corrupt or
dysfunctional governments can get away with threatening to impose high penalties for even minor
technical violations if a bribe is not paid (i.e.: extortion).
In such an environment, firms reporting 10 or more employees (and hence under the jurisdiction
of the inspector) may face a choice between exposing themselves to the penalty, e, or paying a
41See, for example, a model of corruption such as the one in Khan et al. (2014).
42This does not not require much imagination. As we mentioned in Section 1.2, many of the laws have components
that are antiquated, arbitrary, contradictory and confusing. That the laws may be impossible to fully comply with is
suggested by some of the anecdotes we provide in Appendix 2 as well as the following observation, which we re-quote:
“Rules under the Factories Act, framed in 1948, provide for white washing of factories. Distemper won’t do. Earthen
pots filled with water are required. Water coolers won’t suffice. Red-painted buckets filled with sand are required. Fire
extinguishers won’t do... And so on” (TeamLease Services, 2006).
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bribe, b. Assume that inspectors face no costs or benefits from imposing the penalty on the firm, but
naturally benefit from receiving the bribe. There is thus a surplus to be had from paying/receiving
the bribe b and avoiding the penalty. If the inspector and firm Nash Bargain over the surplus with
bargaining weights a and b, respectively, the problem is the following:
max
b
(b)a(e b)b
The solution is for the firm to pay a bribe b = aa+b ⇤ e. The cost born by the firm is therefore
increasing in a, the bargaining weight of the inspector, and in e, the maximum penalty to which the
firm can be subjected. It is reasonable to imagine that this maximum level of extortion, e, is roughly
proportional to the size of the firm, so that e = e0 ⇤n, where n is the number of workers in the firm
and e0 is the per worker level of extortion. In that case the bribe per worker, bn , is equal to
a
a+b ⇤e0.43
This framework can be embedded into the firm’s choice of true and reported employment as
modeled in Section 1.4.3. In particular, the firm now faces a choice between reporting employment
greater than or less than 10, where reporting less than 10 allows it to avoid the costs of bribery, and
reporting greater than 10 exposes it to the bribery costs. In that framework, t corresponds to bn ,
and is therefore increasing in the bargaining power of the inspector (a) and the corruption level of
the state (e0). In this way, we can make sense of the empirical results above in terms of this basic
framework. Again, a more fully fleshed out model that explicitly incorporates features missing here
(such as an appeals process and inspector types) is provided in Appendix 3.
1.6.3 Possible Consequences of t
In the subsections above, we tried to argue that our estimated costs (t) are most likely due, not only
to the substance of the regulations themselves, but also to high levels of corruption. In this subsec-
tion we will indicate possible consequences of high values of t. Again, the results cannot be given a
causal interpretation, but we find them compelling nevertheless. In what follows we use two distinct
43Again, we provide some support for the claim that bribes are proportional to the number of workers with anecdotal
evidence from ipaidabribe.com in Appendix 2.
37
measures of t: one which is created using all the enterprises in a state, regardless of economic sector
(t) and another which is created using only the enterprises engaged in manufacturing (tmanu f ).
Table 1.8 displays the results of employment growth in the manufacturing sector between 2010
and 2005 at the State Level regressed against our two measures of labor market distortions (t and
tmanu f ) as well competing measures (BB and Dougherty). For each of the four measures, we ob-
serve its performance as a predictor of future employment growth in registered manufacturing as
well as its correlation with employment growth in unregistered manufacturing. Interestingly, in the
regressions of employment growth in registered manufacturing against t and tmanu f , the coefficient
on t is negative and at least weakly significant, while the coefficient for employment growth in un-
registered manufacturing is positive - significantly so in the case of tmanu f . This result makes sense:
we should expect higher costs to negatively effect the sectors to which the costs apply - in this case
the registered sector, since that is under the ambit of labor regulations while the unregistered sector
is not. If these correlations reflect a causal chain, it would mean that high levels of regulator costs
and corruption (as measured by t) are pushing employment from the registered to the unregistered
sector.
Also included in Table 1.8 are the results of employment growth in manufacturing regressed
against the BB and Dougherty measures. Neither regressor has a coefficient that is statistically
significant or of a meaningful magnitude.44 Putting aside the considerable caveat that none of these
results has the virtue of exogenous variation, it would appear to be the case that our measures of
labor market distortions do a better job of predicting future employment growth (or the lack thereof)
than the established alternatives. This is also true when considering future growth in manufacturing
productivity rather than employment, as shown in Table 1.9. Higher levels of t are associated with
slower growth of productivity in the registered manufacturing sector (less so in the unregistered
sector)
44One might argue that it is not quite fair to regress growth between 2010 and 2005 on a regressor that uses data only
up until 1997 (as is the case for the BB measure). However, a) we have duplicated these results using from growth from
1997 to 2002 and the results are the same, and b) the Besley Burgess measure from Aghion et al. (2008) should be largely
the same in 2005 due to the lack of state level reforms between 1997 and 2005.
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Table 1.8: Manufacturing Employment Growth (2005 - 2010) vs Tau and Other Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf
tau -0.0240 0.00197
(0.0176) (0.0233)
tau (manuf) -0.0471⇤⇤ 0.0623⇤⇤
(0.0217) (0.0256)
Besley-Burgess -0.00525 0.00979
measure (regs) (0.00731) (0.0142)
Dougherty measure 0.0226 -0.0143
(all reforms) (0.0130) (0.0159)
log of net state 0.00312 0.0189 0.0107 0.0192 0.00413 0.0140 0.0212 0.0136
domestic product pc (0.0178) (0.0214) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.00863) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0195)
share of employment -0.393 0.00558 -0.708⇤⇤ 0.435 0.0194 -0.559 -0.515⇤ 0.0525
in manufacturing (0.258) (0.329) (0.258) (0.325) (0.186) (0.362) (0.245) (0.323)
Constant 0.0969 -0.182 0.0372 -0.229 0.0209 -0.0675 -0.0861 -0.131
(0.173) (0.209) (0.139) (0.152) (0.0825) (0.160) (0.147) (0.182)
Observations 18 17 18 17 15 15 18 17
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses, Only including Major Indian States
39
Table 1.9: Manufacturing Productivity Growth (2005 - 2010) vs Tau and Other Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf
tau -0.0321⇤⇤ 0.00522
(0.0146) (0.0239)
tau (manuf) -0.0512⇤⇤ -0.0567⇤
(0.0181) (0.0275)
Besley-Burgess -0.00266 -0.00372
measure (regs) (0.0122) (0.0154)
Dougherty measure 0.0167 0.00973
(all reforms) (0.0122) (0.0166)
log of net state -0.0160 -0.00902 -0.00478 -0.0120 -0.00455 -0.00723 0.00438 -0.00793
domestic product pc (0.0148) (0.0220) (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0143) (0.0182) (0.0145) (0.0204)
share of employment 0.206 0.0392 -0.154 -0.349 0.453 0.526 0.0728 0.0104
in manufacturing (0.214) (0.338) (0.215) (0.350) (0.310) (0.392) (0.230) (0.338)
Constant 0.141 0.124 0.0454 0.198 -0.0208 0.0530 -0.0678 0.119
(0.144) (0.214) (0.116) (0.163) (0.137) (0.174) (0.138) (0.190)
Observations 18 17 18 17 15 15 18 17
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses, Only including Major Indian States
1.6.4 Inter-temporal Variation: A Final Puzzle
As we have noted, all of the analysis above uses data only from the 2005 Economic Census. How-
ever, the discontinuity observed in the 2005 data does not appear in the 1990 or 1998 ECs. Explain-
ing the puzzling inter-temporal variation is a main goal of our future work. Perhaps the simplest
explanation is that the data quality of the EC improved between 1998 and 2005. Indeed, it is intu-
itive that the presence of a downshift will be harder to discern upon the introduction of measurement
error. This explanation has received anecdotal support from our meetings with the Directors of the
state Directorates of Economics and Statistics, who largely claimed to be more confident in the re-
sults of the 2005 EC than in the results of previous rounds. One reason for this could be that the
2005 EC was the first wave in which ICR (“intelligent character recognition”) was used to read in
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Figure 1.7: Variation in the distribution of establishment size across time:
the raw data. This technology should have gone a long way in alleviating the considerable amount
of error that comes from manual interpretation and typing.
But one might also be concerned in the other direction: that somehow the distortion observed in
2005 is anomalous and is perhaps due to something like a change in the EC’s enumeration practices.
Based on our interviews with officials and enumerators in charge of collecting these data, however,
we believe this is unlikely. While we have discovered that enumeration practices have changed
slightly over the years, we have not discovered changes that could have produced the specific pat-
terns we observe. For example, unlike the previous waves, the 2005 Economic Census included
an “address slip” that was meant to be filled out for establishments with 10 or more workers. It
is conceivable that enumerators, in an effort to avoid the extra work of filling out the address slip,
preferred to misrepresent the number of workers for establishments with more than 10 workers.
However, while this could reasonably explain why there are fewer 10, 11 and 12 person establish-
ments, we find it hard to understand how this kind of phenomenon could explain why there are also
fewer 30, 40 and 50 person establishments (see section 1.4.3 for more on this). Furthermore, in post-
enumeration checks done in West Bengal, Bihar and Tamil Nadu, this kind of misrepresentation was
not found to be in occurrence.
Nor does the culprit seem to be changes in the regulations themselves. Indeed, none of the
regulations which we assume are responsible for the discontinuity in 2005 were greatly changed
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in the right direction between 1990 and 2005. There were reforms on the margin (reflected in the
Dougherty (2009) measures), and these do seem to be correlated with our measures of t, but most
of the changes have gone in the direction of loosening regulations and thus cannot explain why t
would have increased over time. Enforcement has also changed to some degree, but we have not yet
found evidence that it can explain the variation in our data (see the interstate analysis above).
Another possible (but ultimately unlikely) explanation is that changes in the competitive envi-
ronment, particularly related to the increased exposure to international markets and competition, are
responsible. The period in question (1998 to 2005) saw heavy reductions in protective barriers from
foreign competition - particularly through the elimination of non-tariff barriers. However, in our
preliminary analysis (not yet reported) we do not find a strong link between trade liberalization and
t, and such link as exists goes in the opposite direction.
A final possibility is that changes in the availability of contract labor cause the discontinuity to
show up in 2005. Indeed, there was a large speed-up in the use of contract labor over the period,45
however state-level changes in the fraction of contract labor in registered manufacturing are not
robustly correlated with t. The absence of such a correlation is not necessarily evidence that such a
link does not exist, but it does not give support to the hypothesis either.
We have been able to share this intertemporal paradox with a number of experts regarding these
issues in India but have not yet been able to find a watertight explanation. This continues to be a
priority in our ongoing work.
1.7 Conclusion
Our goals in this paper are 1) to document the effect of size-based labor regulations on the misallo-
cation of resources across firms via the employment decisions of business enterprises, 2) to estimate
the net costs of the set of regulations that become binding when establishments choose to employ
10 or more workers, and 3) to shed some light on the source of these costs by demonstrating that
45In the registered manufacturing sector, the share of contract labor in total labor increased from 15% to 26%. Prior to
this period, its growth was markedly slower.
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corruption in the form of harassment bribery may play a large role in making Indian regulations
costly. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide cost estimates of regulations in
India (particularly non-IDA regulations), the first to analyze the effects of regulations without using
necessarily subjective evaluations of state-level amendments to labor laws, and the first to provide
evidence for the link between regulatory costs and corruption.
To accomplish these tasks, we use the 2005 Economic Census of India, an uncommonly used
dataset which is uniquely suited to our task because it includes the entire universe of non-farm
enterprises. In our investigation, we find a significant level shift down in the natural log of the
probability mass of establishments with 10 or more workers. Adapting a method from Garicano
et al. (2013), we interpret this as evidence of substantial per-worker costs of operating above the 10
worker threshold. At the all-India level, we find that operating at or above the 10-worker threshold
is associated with a 35% increase in the unit cost of labor as modeled. Furthermore, we observe a
great deal of variation in our estimated costs by state, industry and ownership type. We estimate the
highest (lowest) costs for privately owned firms (government-owned firms) and firms in construction
(public administration and defense).
Exploring this variation reveals that Indian states with the highest costs also have the highest
levels of corruption and poor governance (as measured through two distinct indices), and that firms
in industries with high bureaucratic dependence are exposed to particularly high costs if they are
also in highly corrupt states. This analysis suggests that the size of regulatory costs may have as
much to do with how regulations are implemented and who implements them, as with the content
of the specific labor and industrial laws themselves. We hope that these findings will help shift the
present debate away from arguments over the pro or anti-labor stance of regulations and towards
arguments about clarity, bureaucracy and the proper enforcement of regulations.
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Appendix 1: Full Results by State and Industry46
Table 1.10: Estimates of Tau by State
State Tau Standard Error
Andhra Pradesh -.159 .038
Assam .322 .041
Bihar .693 .069
Delhi .427 .048
Gujarat .165 .047
Himachal Pradesh -.165 .023
Haryana .007 .044
Jharkhand .388 .061
Karnataka .52 .06
Kerala .138 .033
Maharashtra .332 .038
Madhya Pradesh .379 .047
Orissa .283 .044
Punjab .096 .041
Rajasthan .32 .05
Tamil Nadu .397 .059
Uttar Pradesh .502 .069
West Bengal .151 .054
46Standard errors generated using a wild cluster bootsrap procedure with 200 replications.
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Table 1.11: Estimates of Tau by Industry
Industry Tau Standard Error
Mining and quarrying -.042 .047
Manufacturing .268 .039
Electricity, gas and water supply -.367 .022
Construction .478 .047
Wholesale and retail trade .637 .115
Hotels and restaurants .468 .06
Transport, storage and communications .334 .056
Financial intermediation -.105 .044
Real estate, renting and business activities .601 .062
Public administration and defence -.311 .031
Education -.173 .042
Health and social work .076 .03
Other service activities .264 .057
Extraterritorial organizations and bodies .024 1.315
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Table 1.12: Estimates of Tau by Owernship Type
Ownership Type Tau Standard Error
Government and public sector undertaking -.092 .028
Non profit institution -.04 .038
Unincorporated proprietary .43 .087
Unincorporated partnership -.058 .028
Corporate non financial -.197 .026
Corporate financial -.18 .023
Co-operative -.007 .022
Appendix 2: Anecdotal Evidence Regarding Harassment Bribery from “ipaidabribe.com”
“I am a small factory owner in Kirti Nagar Industrial Area. We follow almost all rules laid down
by government for the welfare of workers. Now, even if we follow everything there is always
somethings where we lack and which needs improvement. We have a factory inspector by the name
of Mr.R.B.Singh (M: 9818829355). He comes to all the factories in our area, inspects them, find
mistakes and then harass and blackmails us. According to him he can get our factories sealed. To
avoid this, to save our time and to save the unnecessary paperwork we pay him every year. I have
paid him twice in two years i.e. 10000 & 15000 and this is common with all factories. Please take a
strict action against him so that he learns a lesson. I am sure he is not alone. All his colleagues are
equally corrupt.”
(Reported on August 11, 2014 from New Delhi, Delhi — Report #131791)
“During the routine labor verification process by the labor department at our office, we were
advised by the consultant to pay the labor inspector a bribe to ensure that they don’t keep calling us
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for needless paperwork.”
(Reported on June 28, 2011 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #35064)
“The Labour Department requires a dozen odd registers to be maintained some of them which
are totally outdated and pointless. E.g: Salary register, Attendance register, Leave register etc.
Our IT office has an electronic system that logs all entries/exits and leave taken. We have the
records and offerred to provide it to them in a printout.
Salaries are paid electronically via bank transfer.
The officer declined and said it must be maintained in a manual register!
Finally an arrangement was made where we maintain a few records manually and the rest he
would overlook.
Cost of arrangement Rs 1500 twice a year even if the officer shows up only once a year for the
inspection!
He is supposed to inspect twice so expects to be paid even for the time he did not show up!”
(Reported on October 13, 2010 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #44950)
“Well i had gone to renew my labour license and after all the running around in the bank and
the department, the signing authority asked me to pay Rs.500 for signing. When asked why 500,
i was told since there are 5 employess for Rs.100 each.” (Reported on December 31, 2010 from
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh — Report #43509 )
“... in my third visit i met one of office peon in Labour office he guided me for the bribe he also
investigated and advised me for bribe according to the number of Employees deployed on contract
basis and for this valueble suggestion he charged me Rs. 100. Again with full confidence i went to
the ALCs desk and straight away i offered him the packet which was contains the amount of Bribe
Rs. 3000/- ... He issued me the license after office hours...” (Reported on March 30, 2011 from
Mumbai, Maharashtra — Report #39133)
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“Applying for shop & establishment [registration] & procured all documents relating to the
registration. Finally inspectors are asking Rs.1000 as a bribe. If any other notice received by the
company for resolving that another Rs.2000 and above , it depends on the company” (Reported on
March 28, 2014 from Bangalore, Karnataka — Report #99016)
“Officer name Naveen Kumar . Mobile no. 9468104694- He is asking for a bribe of 60,000
and is saying will issue a negative report under labour laws.” (Reported on January 24, 2014 from
Gurgaon, Haryana — Report #83365)
Appendix 3: Modeling Extortion (ie: Harassment Bribery)
In this Appendix we model size-based regulations in an environment where corrupt inspectors use
the fact that de jure regulations are numerous, complex and burdensome in order to extort bribes
from firms (ie: harassment bribery). The model aims to illustrate how corruption may lead to higher
per worker costs for firms that exceed the 10 worker threshold, while being as parsimonious as
possible. The set-up and timeline is described below and in Figure 1.8.
First, firms must choose their number of workers (n  10 or n0< 10).47 As in Section 1.4.1, firms
are characterized by a productivity parameter a, so that firms with higher productivity would like
to choose higher n. If firms choose n greater than or equal to 10, they come under the legal purview
of size-based regulations, which makes it more difficult for them to appeal extortionary practices on
the part of inspectors. After choosing a level of employment, firms are randomly matched with an
inspector. With probability k, the inspector is corrupt; otherwise the inspector is honest. An honest
inspector will enforce a reasonable interpretation of the spirit of the regulations if the firm has more
than 10 workers. To be compliant with this “reasonable” interpretation of the regulations will cost
the firm an amount F1(n), which may in general depend on the number of workers in the firm. A
firm with fewer than 10 workers incurs no regulatory costs if matched with an honest inspector.
47Throughout, primes will denote the values of variables on the side of the decision tree in which firms hire less than
10 workers.
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If the firm is instead matched with a corrupt inspector, the inspector will threaten to report the
firm for technical infractions unless it pays a bribe (which we denote b or b0, depending on whether
the firm has chosen n  10 or n0 < 10), the value of which is determined by Nash Bargaining. The
firm may choose to pay the bribe or appeal the threatened fine in court. If appealing the fine in court,
the firm will win with probability p (or p0) but will incur legal fees (cL) with certainty. If it wins the
case, the firm has no further financial obligations. If the firm loses, it is obliged to pay an amount
F2(n), which we take to be much larger than F1(n). This last assumption is tantamount to supposing
that a reasonable level of compliance with regulations is not extremely costly in comparison to the
punishments that could be brought by an inspector for violating the regulations - which may be a
reasonable assumption in contexts where inspectors have a great amount of bargaining power and/or
punishments can involve prison sentences. The assumption is also necessary for the framework to
be one of extortion rather than collusion: if F1(n) were large in comparison with F2(n), firms would
benefit from collusion and would face lower costs with corrupt inspectors than with honest ones.
It is also plausible that both F2(n) and F1(n) are increasing functions of the number of workers,
especially if we acknowledge that the full cost of any fine would include the opportunity cost of
a manager’s time. We will consider the case where the total fines are directly proportional to the
number of workers: Fi(n) = fi ⇤n. The decision tree representing the firm’s choices described above
is provided in Figure 1.8.
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Figure 1.8: Decision Tree
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An important assumption is that p0, the probability of a firm’s winning the case when n0 < 10,
is much higher than p, the probability of winning the case when n   10. The idea is that a firm
with less than 10 workers is not under the legal purview of the regulations, so any case regarding
regulatory infractions brought against the firm would have no standing in court. In what follows,
we will take p = 0 and p0 = 1 for simplicity. As previously mentioned, if the firm meets a corrupt
inspector, the value of the bribe paid to avoid going to court is determined through a process of Nash
Bargaining over the surplus, where a and b are the bargaining weights of the inspector and firm,
respectively:
max
b
(b)a(cL+(1  p)F2(n) b)b
The solution of this maximization problem is that b= a(cL+(1 p)F2(n))a+b (and b
0 = a(cL+(1 p
0)F2(n))
a+b ,
for firms with less than 10 workers). Given that firms meet corrupt inspectors (and thus pay bribes)
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with probability k and meet honest inspectors (and thus pay F1(n)) with probability 1  k, the
expected cost for a firm with greater than 10 workers is kb+(1 k)F1(n), while the expected cost
for a firm with less than 10 workers is kb0. Taking the difference and substituting in our expressions
for b and b0, we get that firms that cross the 10 worker threshold face an increase in expected costs
of k aa+b(p
0   p)F2(n)+(1 k)F1(n).
We are interested, however, in the increase in per worker costs that firms face when exceeding
the 10 worker threshold, not the increase in total costs (as discussed earlier, an increase in per worker
costs is the only way to produce a downshift in the logged firm size distribution in a static model).
Thus, we divide the last result by the number of workers, n, to get per worker costs. Before doing
so, we make the further simplifications that p = 0, p0 = 1, a and b both equal 1 (equal bargaining
weights), and that all fines are proportional to firm size (Fi(n) = fi ⇤ n). Then, the increase in per
worker costs for firms that exceed the 10 worker threshold is k f22 +(1 k) f1.
From the last result we see that if f2   f1 (in particular, in this case, if f2 > 2 f1), then the
increase in a firm’s per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (i.e.: what we call t in
the paper) is increasing in the proportion of corrupt inspectors, k. Again, that we are considering
a context of extortion or “harassment bribery” is implied by the assumption f2   f1. It is this
condition (that f2 is very large) that gives corrupt inspectors the power to extract heavy bribes. We
think it is a reasonable assumption given the anecdotal evidence regarding bribery we have found
(some of which we present in Appendix 2). To conclude, the model above illustrates conditions that
may explain the correlations we observed between corruption and t in Section 1.6. In particular,
the conclusion of the model is that firms in states with a higher proportion of corrupt inspectors (ie:
more corrupt states), face higher per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (higher t).
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Chapter 2
Judicial Institutions, Relationship-Specificity and Growth: Evidence from India
2.1 Introduction
There is now a large empirical literature on the primary importance of “good institutions” gener-
ally in explaining growth and development. Most of this research has been been conducted at the
cross country level, where measures of institutions are coarse (and often subjective), endogeneity
concerns are uppermost, and convincing sources of identification are hard to come by.1 As a result,
there is less clarity on the relative importance of constituent institutional components (such as legal
institutions, property rights institutions, cultural institutions, democratic institutions and so on). The
value of high quality formal judicial institutions in particular has been disputed. Some have argued
that well functioning formal judicial institutions are important economic determinants (Berkowitz
et al. (2006); Nunn (2007); Levchenko (2007); Chemin (2012)) while others have argued that they
are not (Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)), the latter suggesting that informal arrangements may serve
as workable substitutes. This paper aims to address the question of whether well functioning formal
judicial institutions are important for growth and development, by taking advantage of insights from
the theoretical literature on incomplete contracts as well as variation across states and industries in
a within-country setting.
Judicial institutions can be dysfunctional in a variety of ways, but perhaps the most pervasive
source of judicial dysfunction in developing countries is the slow speed of courts. India, with a
backlog of cases that one High Court Justice has said would take 320 years to clear, is certainly no
exception.2 Slow courts are detrimental to a well functioning legal system because they increase
the cost of enforcing contracts by delaying the payoff of taking an agent to court. If contracts
are difficult or costly to enforce, underinvestment is more likely to ocurr and potentially surplus
1See Pande and Udry (2005) for an overview of the concerns.
2“Courts will take 320 years to clear backlog cases: Justice Rao.” The Times of India, March
6, 2010. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Courts-will-take-320-years-to-clear-backlog-cases-Justice-
Rao/articleshow/5651782.cms.
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generating transactions are less likely to ocurr (Williamson (1979)). This should be all the more
true of transactions that involve relationship-specific investments (Klein et al. (1978), Grossman
and Hart (1986)).
Following Berkowitz et al. (2006), Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007), the identification strat-
egy employed in this paper hinges on this last point: that well functioning judicial institutions
should be especially important for growth in contract intensive industries - which I will define, fol-
lowing Nunn (2007), as those industries that require more relationship-specific inputs. My empirical
methodology is then to regress growth (in firms’ value added, profits, employment and net entry) on
the interaction between an objective measure of the speed of courts (at the state level) and a measure
of contract intensity (at the industry level) from Nunn (2007). Focusing on the interaction allows
much greater flexibility in addressing concerns regarding the endogeneity of contracting institutions
and in performing a rigorous battery of robustness tests, to which is devoted a significant portion of
the paper.
The paper’s main finding is that faster courts have a stronger positive effect on growth (in all
four dependent variables above) in more contract intensive industries - a finding which is robust to
a number of alternative explanations, threats and placebo tests. In particular, the point estimates
suggest that, for an industry in the 75th percentile of contract intensity, an improvement of one
standard deviation in court efficiency would imply a higher annual growth rate of gross value added
by 1.4 percentage points.3 For comparison, the (unweighted) mean annual growth rate of value
added among firms is -5.9 percentage points, so this is a significant amount.
As previously noted, this paper employs a similar identification strategy to Berkowitz et al.
(2006), Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007). All three papers provide evidence that countries with
higher quality judicial institutions have higher exports in industries that are more dependent on
contract enforcement (where this dependence is proxied by industry “complexity” or “contract in-
tensity”). In particular, I make use of Nunn (2007)’s measure of contract intensity in this analysis -
after matching it to the available Indian industry codes. In spite of the above similarities, there are
3The growth rates of all dependent variables in the analysis, including value added, are constructed at the state x
industry level.
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some important differences between the papers above and this one. First, the papers above conduct
their analysis at the cross country level while the analysis here is within country. In addition to
reducing concerns regarding endogeneity (due to the vast set of institutional, cultural, and historical
differences that exist across countries and are correlated with one another), conducting the analysis
within country allows one to use an objective and comparable measure of court speed rather than
subjective measures that are likely to measure a host of other factors.4 Conducting the analysis at a
more micro level also allows one to subject the analysis to a more systematic set of placebo and ro-
bustness tests. Finally, while these papers focus on trying to document the effect of judicial quality
on trade patterns, I examine the more general effect on growth in a country’s manufacturing sector.
This paper also shares similarities with Ahsan (2013) and Chemin (2012), two within country
studies that also examine the effet of Indian courts on economic outcomes. Ahsan (2013) shows
that the lowering of input tariffs increased the productivity of firms more in states with faster courts.
Chemin (2012) argues that a legal reform passed in 2002 (the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment
Act, 2002) succeeded in speeding up courts and reducing trial backlogs - which he then argues
induced investment by small unorganized firms. In addition to the fact that I ask a different question
and use a different methodology, this paper also differs from the previous two in the population of
firms that is studied. Ahsan (2013), using Prowess data from the CMIE, studies the largest firms
in India (mostly those that are publicly traded), while Chemin (2012), using the National Sample
Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) survey of unorganized manufacturing enterprises, studies the very
smallest firms. This paper uses the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to study medium and large
sized manufacturing firms - nearly all of which would be excluded from both CMIE Prowess and
the NSSO’s unorganized manufacturing surveys for being either too small or too big. This is an
important population to study as the firms in the ASI represent the entire formal manufacturing
sector in India, contribute a large share (about 10%) to GDP and are large enough to make use of
courts.
4For example, both Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) use the “Rule of Law” index from Kaufmann et al. (2004)
as their primary measure of judicial quality. This measure is based on a survey of perceptions among certain subsets of
agents in each country.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I begin by presenting some background informa-
tion on judicial institutions in India (Section 2.2) and then discussing the data used in the investi-
gation (Section 3.4). Then I present the main results of the empirical investigation in Section 2.4,
followed by a substantial set of robustness and placebo checks in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
Judicial inefficiency in India
India’s judicial system is inefficient, even in comparison to other developing countries. For exam-
ple, India ranks 186 (out of 189) on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicator for “Enforcing
Contracts”. According to many observers - including many within the government of India and the
judiciary itself - the biggest problems related to Indian courts (especially lower courts) are the slow
rate of case disposal and the concomitant large backlog of cases.5 This also turns up in the World
Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, where it is estimated that it would take 1,420 days to resolve a
hypothetical commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods (only 5 countries are worse on this
measure).
Though bad on average, there is, however, considerable spatial variation in the extent of this
problem. For example, in 2013, the percentage of all cases still pending trial (i.e.: the pendency
rate, which is a common measure of case backlog) in West Bengal was an incredible 96.4%, while
the pendency rate of Tamil Nadu was a significantly more respectable 64.8%.6
Sources of geographic variation in court efficiency
The reasons for this geographic variation are manifold. The most proximate causes are likely differ-
ences in judicial strength (i.e.: numbers of judges) and rates of disposal (which may be a function
5“Courts will take 320 years to clear backlog cases: Justice Rao.” The Times of India, March
6, 2010. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Courts-will-take-320-years-to-clear-backlog-cases-Justice-
Rao/articleshow/5651782.cms.
6Jain, Dipti (2014), “The slow moving wheels of Indian judiciary.” Mint, August 5, 2014.
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/VlqmTLJ1UzNtmKd7BuRVbM/The-slow-moving-wheels-of-Indian-judiciary.html.
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of different legal norms and procedures) across states (Singh (2003) Mookherjee (1993)). The ad-
ministration of all lower courts (as well as State High Courts) is under the adminstration of state
governments. This power includes the appointment of judges and the creation of posts, and has been
used to explain the significant differences in court efficiency across states (Ahsan (2013)). Other
sources of variation may have their roots further back in time.
Indeed, much of India’s legal system has been inherited from the pre-Independence era. This
includes its status as a system of common law but it also includes specific legislation and legal codes
developed by the British7 - as well as those prevailing in the Princely States, which maintained their
own legal systems until Independence (and to which British laws did not usually apply). The fact
that different regions in India had different historical legal systems and that both histories influ-
ence Indian law today may be another source of geographical variation in court efficiency. Fully
explaining the source of this geographic variation is beyond the scope of this paper, and I will take
the variation as given in our empirical analysis. Note that my identification strategy does not re-
quire variation in court efficiency to be uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of growth. It
requires only that any unobservable determinants of growth that are correlated with court efficiency
are not also correlated with industry level relationship specificity. I will do my best to test this
assumption in the robustness checks.
The structure of the legal system
In order to understand the data on court efficiency and how it is used in my analysis, it is helpful
to introduce some basic facts about Indian’s court system. The structure of India’s court system is
hierarchical, with the Supreme Court of India at the top of the hierarchy. Directly below are the
State High Courts, and below them are several tiers of lower courts at the district level. The Court
of the District and Sessions Judge is the highest court at the district level and is the only court at the
district level that hears both civil and criminal cases. Below this court, the remaining district level
courts are divided on the basis of whether they hear civil or criminal cases, exclusively. Among
7The Indian Contract Act, for example, was passed in 1872, and to this day it is the primary law governing the
circumstances in which contracts entered into will be legally binding.
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civil courts below the District/Sessions Court, there may be (in descending order) an Additional
District Judge’s Court, a Senior Civil Judge’s Court, a Principal Junior Civil Judge’s Court and a
Junior Civil Judge’s Court. Among criminal courts below the District/Sessions Court, there may
be a Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court, a First Class Judicial Magistrate’s Court, a Second Class
Judicial Magistrate Court and a Special Judicial Magistrate’s Court.
Since I am interested in the effect of court efficiency on the ability of firms to enter into con-
tracts with one another, it is the efficiency of civil courts rather than criminal courts that is of primary
relevance to this analysis. However, the data on court speed covers mostly criminal courts at the
district level - with one exception: I also have data covering the Court of the District and Ses-
sions Judge, which hears both civil and criminal cases. I therefore focus on the efficiency of these
District/Sessions courts and use the data on the other types of courts only as a placebo test.8
As a final point, it is worthwhile to ask: do firms even use courts? According to the 2005 World
Bank Enterprise Surveys (as reported in Ahsan (2013)), they do: about 12.5% of firms in the survey
report being involved in court cases over the period 2001-204, and about 22.5% of firms report poor
contract enforcement as a constraint to doing business (Ahsan (2013)).
2.3 Data
The data used in the analysis come from several sources. The primary outcome variables of interest
are firm gross value added, profits, employment and the total number of firms, which are used to
measure net entry. These variables come from India’s Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) over the
period 1998/9-2007/8. The ASI is a factory level survey which is meant to be representitive of the
entire registered manufacturing sector (i.e.: all manufacturing enterprises that are registered with
the government).9 I note here that India has a large unregistered manufacturing sector, which will
8Although it is quite likely that the efficiency of criminal and civil district level courts should be correlated (within
a district the types of courts share similar procedures and even judges), one would nevertheless expect the efficiency of
civil courts to be more strongly correlated with growth of contract intensive industries because it is a more direct measure
of the relevant object.
9Although the data are originally at the factory level, I collapse the data at the state-industry-year level for most of my
analysis below as the relevant variation occurs at this level.
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be left out of the present analysis. This omission should not greatly change the conclusions of
the analysis - for two reasons. First, although much smaller in employment terms, the registered
manufacturing sector accounts for a disproportionate share (about two-thirds) of total manufacturing
output in India (Amirapu and Subramanian (2015)). Second, units in the unregistered sector are less
likely to make use of the formal legal system than units in the registered sector due to legal fixed
costs and the illegal nature of some unregistered units. Now, it is possible that the efficiency of
courts is a determinant of the size of the informal sector in the first place. While recognition of this
possibility should not change the validity of my results for the formal sector, it is nevertheless an
interesting possibility which I hope to study in later work.
The data on court efficiency are obtained at the state-year level from annual “Crime in India”
Reports, published by India’s National Crime Records Bureau. Among the data available from this
report is information on the duration of cases brought to trial in various types of lower courts (i.e.:
courts at the district level, below the state High Courts). The focus of the report is on criminal rather
than civil trials, and the types of courts for which data is supplied include mostly those that handle
criminal cases exclusively (especially, those courts presided over by Judicial Magistrates). However,
the report also provides data pertaining to the “Court of the District and Sessions Judge”, the highest
court at the district level, which handles both civil and criminal cases. My primary measure of court
efficiency is therefore the fraction of cases resolved within one year in the District/Sessions Court.
As a placebo test, I will also consider the fraction of cases resolved in one year by all types of courts
(i.e.: including also those courts that handle criminal cases). The expectation is that the speed of
criminal courts should be a less robust predictor of growth in contract intensive industries than the
speed of courts that handle civil cases.
The last important set of data are industry level measures of contract intensity/relationship-
specificity, taken from Nunn (2007). Nunn (2007) built these measures from the work of Rauch
(1999), who categorized each of 1,189 industries (according to the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 codes)
according to whether they could be bought on an organized exchange, referenced priced10, or nei-
10i.e.: whether a price for the good could be found in a trade publication.
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ther. If a product could be bought on an organized exchange, that was taken to indicate significant
market thickness (i.e.: a large number of buyers and sellers of the good) and/or a certain degree of
homogeneity in the production of that good, and hence a low level of “relationship-specificity” . A
product that could be reference priced was assumed to have an intermediate degree of relationship-
specificity, while products that could neither be bought on an exchange nor reference priced were
assumed to have relatively thin markets and a high level of relationship-specificity. According to
theoretical work such as Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979), goods with thick markets/less
relationship-specificity are less susceptible to the problem of hold-up and therefore less “contract-
intensive”, while goods with thin markets/more relationship-specificity would be most in need of
enforceable contracts to guard against the threat of hold-up. Using Rauch’s classification of goods
according to their relationship-specificity, Nunn created the following industry level measure of
“contract intensity” (zrsi ) equal to the share of an industry’s inputs that can not be purchased on an
organized exchange:
zrsi =Â
j
qi j(Rneitherj +R
re f price
j )
Here, qi j is the value of input j divided by the total value of all inputs used by industry i, Rre f pricej
is the proportion of input j that is reference precied, and Rneitherj is the proportion of input j that is
neither sold on an exchange nor reference priced.
Nunn created this measure for 381 industries classified according to the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Input-Output (IO) industry classifcation. In order to use this measure in my anal-
ysis, I have created a mapping between the US BEA IO industry codes to 5 digit Indian National
Industry Classification (NIC) codes from 1998. An example of how this mapping was done is to be
found in Table 2.1. In constructing the mapping, I did my best to map industries according to their
titles and descriptions. In most cases, industry codes could be matched cleanly and with relatively
little ambiguity regarding the match. Cases in which the mapping between industry codes was more
uncertain were recorded as such and are left out in robustness tests. In some cases, no reasonable
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mapping could be found between certain industry codes. This happened either because the industry
classifcation structures differed considerably or because certain products were unique to the US or
Indian context (e.g: glass bangles and bidi cigarettes in India). In these cases, such products were
left out of the analysis altogether.
After applying the mapping from NIC codes to BEA IO codes, 282,651 observations in the
ASI between 1998/9 and 2007/8 (about 80% of the total) could be matched with a BEA IO code
and corresponding “contract intensity” measure (about 70% of these matched observations were
“certain” matches), of which there were 201 unique BEA IO codes represented in the dataset. Tables
2.2 and 2.3 display the 15 least and most contract intensive industries, respectively, among those
industries present in the ASI and matched to NIC codes with strong confidence in the match.
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Table 2.1: Example of concordance between NIC and BEA IO codes
Match NIC code NIC description BEA IO code BEA IO description
yes 16001 Tobacco stemming,
redrying etc. of
tobacco leaf
312210 Tobacco stemming &
redrying
yes 16003 Manufacture of
cigarette and cigarette
tobacco
312221 Cigarette man.
no - - 312229 Oth. tobacco product
man.
no 16002 Manufacture of bidi - -
no 16004 Manufacture of cigars
and cheroots
- -
no 16008 Manufacture of pan
masala and related
products
- -
yes 2413 Manufacture of
plastics in primary
forms and of synthetic
rubber
325211 Plastics material &
resin man
yes 24131 Manufacture of
synthetic rubber in
primary forms
325212 Synthetic rubber man
unsure 24133 Manufacture of
cellulose and its
chemical derivatives
in primary form
325221 Cellulosic organic
fiber man
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Table 2.2: 15 Least Contract Intensive Industries
NIC
industry
code
BEA IO
industry
code
industry description contract
intensity
(zrs2i )
15311 311211 Flour milling .0959204
15321 311221 Wet corn milling .1461177
15312 311212 Rice milling .1506271
16001 312210 Tobacco stemming & redrying .189198
15114 311615 Poultry processing .2295379
20211 32121A Veneer & plywood man. .481376
20109 321113 Sawmills .5495412
15111 311611 Animal, except poultry, slaughtering .5900722
16003 312221 Cigarette man. .5941259
21011 322110 Pulp mills .6158003
15201 311514 Dry, condensed, & evaporated dairy products .6278917
15116 311612 Meat processed from carcasses .6304269
36912 339910 Jewelry & silverware man. .6401256
27320 33152B Nonferrous foundries, except aluminum .6643769
24114 325130 Synthetic dye & pigment man. .6725274
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Table 2.3: 15 Most Contract-Intensive Industries
NIC
industry
code
BEA IO
industry
code
industry description contract
intensity
(zrs2i )
30006 334111 Electronic computer man. .9995985
15440 311823 Dry pasta man. .9994706
36991 322233 Stationery & related product man. .9994073
34104 336110 Automobile & light truck man. .9978275
22219 323116 Manifold business forms printing .997521
22121 511110 Newspaper publishers .9974136
34101 336120 Heavy duty truck man. .9969729
32301 334300 Audio & video equip. man. .9969063
22110 511130 Book publishers .9963905
22122 511120 Periodical publishers .9962443
30007 334119 Oth. computer peripheral equip. man. .9949551
26915 327113 Porcelain electrical supply man. .9941305
32204 334210 Telephone apparatus man. .9940286
30009 333313 Office mach. man. .9936688
35301 336411 Aircraft man. .9910538
2.3.1 Summary Statistics
The following tables and figures present summary statistics of the main variables used in the anal-
ysis. Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for the main state level variables in 1999, including
“district court efficiency”, which measures the fraction of trials resolved in less than one year in
the District/Sessions Court and is the primary measure of court efficiency used in the following
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analysis.11 The variable “corruption (TI)” gives the state level “corruption score” as measured in a
perceptions-based 2005 study by Transparency International. Other variables are self-explanatory.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of trial durations in 1999 and 2007 - towards the beginning and
end of the period of this study. One can see that the mode trial duration is 1 -3 years, while the
second most frequent category is 3-5 years. A significant fraction of cases take 5 - 10 years to be
resolved. Furthermore, it is sobering to note that speed of resolution seems to be worsening over
time, as a smaller proportion of case are resolved in 6 months or less.
Table 2.5 presents basic information for (BEA IO) industry level variables including “contract
intensity” (i.e.: zrsi ), the measure from Nunn (2007) described in detail above. Note that the dis-
tribution of this variable is highly skewed (see Figure 2.2). As a robustness check, the sample of
industries is divided according to whether they are above or below the 25th percentile (about .85),
considering all those above the 25 percentile to be “contract intensive” and those below to be “not
contract intensive”. The main results that follow are still valid when based on this binary definition
of contract intesity. Table 2.18 of the Appendix provides evidence that observable industry charac-
teristics (such as capital intensity, employment and market concentration) do not seem to be highly
correlated by contract intensive status.
While the independent variables used in this analysis vary either at the state or industry level,
the dependent variables are defined at the state x industry level. These variables (summarized in
Table 2.6) are constructed by summing either real gross value, real profits, employment or num-
bers of factories within each state x industry x year cell, and then calculating annual compounded
growth rates over the 9 year period between 1999 and 2008 (the period over which the data is most
complete). Those summary statistics are presented in Table 2.6. It may be surprising that the mean
values of some variables are negative, but these averages are not weighted by industry output so it
does not necessarily follow that Indian manufacturing shrank over this period. Also of note are the
extremely large standard deviations of the growth rates.
11Actually, for ease of interpretation, we use a normalized version of the variable, district court efficiency (norm), with
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in our analysis.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics - State Level Variables in 1999
count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
district court efficiency 30 0.230 0.225 0.000 0.045 0.166 0.369 0.877
district court efficiency (norm) 30 0.000 1.000 -1.021 -0.820 -0.284 0.615 2.872
court efficiency (all) 32 0.313 0.242 0.000 0.109 0.290 0.422 0.912
log NSDP pc 35 9.916 0.476 8.774 9.642 9.852 10.162 11.109
corruption (TI) 20 4.890 1.048 2.400 4.390 4.935 5.425 6.950
sh agri in GSDP 24 0.273 0.091 0.016 0.210 0.297 0.336 0.411
Figure 2.1: Fraction of Cases by Case Duration (District/Session Judge)
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics - Industry Level Variables in 1999
count mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
contract intensity 195 0.878 0.169 0.096 0.842 0.956 0.977 1.000
contract intensity (norm) 195 0.000 1.000 -4.632 -0.211 0.465 0.590 0.722
capital intensity 195 0.236 0.086 0.032 0.169 0.229 0.319 0.465
log employment 195 3.219 0.627 1.099 2.867 3.164 3.510 5.571
log factor cost ratio 195 -0.166 0.916 -2.815 -0.723 -0.155 0.430 3.297
market concentration 195 0.208 0.167 0.000 0.095 0.163 0.268 1.000
avg num inputs (sector) 193 67.493 10.341 38.000 61.000 68.000 74.000 88.000
HHI inputs (sector) 193 0.873 0.061 0.582 0.848 0.882 0.922 0.946
ln labor prod 193 12.113 0.538 10.239 11.813 12.120 12.442 14.333
TFP lev pet 194 9.800 1.207 7.193 8.978 9.530 10.683 13.336
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Contract Intensity Variable (1999)
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics - State x Industry Level Dependent Variables (1999)
count mean sd min p50 max
9 yr growth rate of gross value added 1534 -0.059 0.219 -0.740 -0.075 1.058
9 yr growth rate of profits 940 -0.058 0.246 -0.771 -0.084 1.206
9 yr growth rate of employment 2176 0.024 0.157 -0.532 0.017 0.925
9 yr growth rate of num factories 2185 -0.003 0.106 -0.343 0.000 0.759
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Before turning to the results, let us revisit the theoretical argument that underpins the identification
strategy. The argument, based on a large body of theoretical work in contract theory and organi-
zational economics (but especially Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1979) and Grossman and Hart
(1986)), is that when economic transactions involving relationship-specific investments take place
in an environment characterized by incomplete (or unenforceable) contracts, hold-up can occur. The
threat of hold-up dissuades efficient ex-ante investment - regardless of organizational form (Gross-
man and Hart (1986)) - and can even deter some transactions from ever taking place, even though
they would potentially increase surplus (e.g.: Blanchard and Kremer (1997)).
The theoretical implication from above is the following: the benefit of being located in a state
with a better contracting environment (in this case, faster courts), should be greater for firms en-
gaged in industries that require more relationship-specific inputs (what Nunn (2007) calls “contract-
intensive” industries) than for firms in industries that don’t use many relationship-specific inputs,
because these latter firms are less reliant on contracts and courts to protect them from the threat of
hold-up. The empirical strategy, then, is to test for a positive interaction between state level judicial
efficiency and industry level contract intensity. This analysis, in the mold of Rajan et al. (1998),
employs the following functional form:
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gs j = bCourtE f f iciencys ⇤ContractIntensity j+d j+ gs+ es j, (2.1)
where gs j is the annual growth rate of various outcome variables (total profits, gross value
added, numbers of employees and numbers of factories - used to measure net entry) in state s and
industry j over the time period for which I have data (1999 to 2008).12 In most of the analysis
below, CourtE f f iciencys is proxied by the fraction of cases in a state’s District/Sessions Courts
that are resolved in less than one year, as measured at the start of the time period (i.e.: in 1999).
ContractIntensity j is the industry level measure from Nunn (2007) detailed in Section 3.4. To make
the results easier to interpret, both of these two independent variables have been normalized to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The coefficient on the interaction term, b, is the parameter of interest. Main interaction terms are
excluded in all but the preliminary results, because of the inclusion of state and industry fixed effects.
The addition of state and industry fixed effects allows me to argue that, in order for the analysis to be
biased by omitted variables, it is not sufficient that these variables be correlated with the state level
measures of court efficiency or the industry level measures of contract intensity. Rather, they must
be correlated with the interaction between state level court efficiency and industry level contract
intensity. The existence of such variables is certainly possible: for example, if corruption was
negatively correlated with court efficiency and had a particularly detrimental effect on the growth of
contract intensive industries, the results would be biased if corruption were left out of the regression.
In Section 2.5, I will perform a variety of placebo and robustness tests in order to provide assurance
that the findings are not being driven by such variables.
12I focus on ex-post growth in outcome variables rather than levels for several reasons. First, focusing on growth makes
the analysis less susceptible to the possibility of reverse causality. Second, levels of court efficiency within states do not
seem to change very quickly over time, making it difficult to find the variation one would need for panel data analysis.
Last, there are theoretical reasons to focus on growth: if institutional features such as court speed cannot be changed
quickly and at low cost, one would expect their one-time values to have a lasting effect on firm behaviour and investments
over time (Rajan et al. (1998)). Nevertheless, I do run some analysis of level effects in the Appendix (Tables 2.19 and
2.20). In that analysis, which is still preliminary and incomplete, I do not find evidence of level effects. In fact, in some
specifications there appear to be negative effects. The reasons for these results remain to be explored.
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2.4.2 Main Empirical Results
2.4.2.1 Preliminary Results (main effects only)
As is commonly done, I begin by first presenting preliminary results that include only the main
interaction terms instead of state and industry fixed effects. The results (in Table 2.7) show that the
interaction between the state level measure of court efficiency (equal to the fraction of cases resolved
in less than 1 year in the District/Sessions Court) and the industry level measure of contract intensity
is indeed positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all cases. The coefficients are also
of large magnitude: for example, the results suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in the
fraction of cases resolved in District/Sessions Courts (i.e.: going from 0 to 1 on the normalized
measure of court efficiency) for an industry in the 75th percentile of contract intensity (normalized
contract intensity ⇡ .590), would imply a higher annual growth rate of gross value added by 1.4
percentage points. The effect is larger for profits (column 2) and smaller for employment and net
entry (columns 3 and 4), though still of substantial magnitude in all cases.
The coefficients on the main terms on the other hand seem to be negative, if anything, but I am
reluctant to make much of these coefficients due to the liklihood of omitted variables at the state or
industry level. Now I turn to the main specification, which includes state and industry fixed effects
and is therefore much better suited to dealing with the threat of omitted variables.
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Table 2.7: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (by District/Sessions Judge) Within One
Year Interacted With Contract Intensity (Just Main Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.00642 0.0111 0.0173⇤⇤⇤ 0.0108⇤⇤⇤
(0.00646) (0.00942) (0.00369) (0.00247)
contract 0.0144⇤ 0.00876 0.00109 -0.00424⇤
intensity (0.00765) (0.0122) (0.00345) (0.00231)
court efficiency 0.0232⇤⇤⇤ 0.0351⇤⇤ 0.00885⇤⇤ 0.00503⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.00876) (0.0137) (0.00370) (0.00248)
Observations 1384 852 1940 1947
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
2.4.2.2 Main Results (including state and industry FEs)
Table 2.8 displays the main results, which now include state and industry fixed effects.13 It can be
seen that the inclusion of state and industry fixed effects does not substantially change the coefficient
on the interaction term for any of the four dependent variables: the interaction of court efficiency
and contract intensity is still a strong predictor of growth in value added, profits, employment and
net entry.
Though I readily concede that the quality of judicial institutions (including the speed of courts)
may be endogenous, the inclusion of state and industry fixed effects makes it harder to argue that
13Standard errors are not clustered in these results. However, the results remain signfiicant at the 5% level when
implementing two-way cluster-robust standard errors (where clustering is done by state and industry) using the user-
written ado file for Stata “cluster2.do”.
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the result is being driven by omitted variables. Furthermore, the fact that the coefficients on the
interactions hardly change upon the inclusion of fixed effects is highly suggestive of the exogeneity
of the interaction term. Nevertheless, in the remaining sections of the paper, I will attempt to
consider and address a number of potential threats to the identification strategy. I begin by first
simply establishing that the result is not unique to a certain specification or sample.
Table 2.8: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (by District/Sessions Judge) Within One
Year Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0235⇤⇤⇤ 0.0346⇤⇤ 0.00911⇤⇤ 0.00554⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.00898) (0.0150) (0.00365) (0.00236)
Observations 1384 852 1940 1947
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
2.4.2.3 Basic Robustness Tests
In the regressions reported above, and in most of what follows, the sample consists of all firms
(collapsed by industry) in the ASI that could be matched by NIC code to BEA IO code in all Indian
states and union territories (UTs). In 1999 there were 32 states and union territories. However, a
number of UTs and some states have extremely small populations and economies (relative to the
average state) and as such may act as outliers driving the results. To be sure this is not the case, I
present results in Table 2.9 that restrict the sample to only those industries located in the 17 largest
states (by gross state domestic product). As can be seen, in all cases, the coefficients are similar or
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somewhat larger than was found in the main results.14
Table 2.9: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (by District/Sessions Judge) Within One
Year Interacted With Contract Intensity - Including Only Major Indian States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0250⇤⇤ 0.0388⇤⇤ 0.0121⇤⇤⇤ 0.00674⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.0100) (0.0177) (0.00420) (0.00278)
Observations 1195 719 1663 1670
Sample Major States Major States Major States Major States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
I noted in Section 3.4 (on Data) that when matching 5 digit NIC codes to BEA IO codes, some
industries could be matched with confidence, others could be matched with less confidence and
some could not be matched at all. To be certain that the results are not being driven by inappro-
priately matched industry codes, I rerun the main specification restricting the sample to only those
industries that could be matched with confidence. The results in Table 2.10 are encouraging: lim-
iting the sample to exclude less certain matches produces similar - or, in the case of gross value
added, substantially strengthened - results.
14In a similar robustness test - not shown - I find that excluding the top and bottom 1% and 5% growth outliers does
not change the results.
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Table 2.10: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (by District/Sessions Judge) Within One
Year Interacted With Contract Intensity - Including only confident industry matches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0372⇤⇤⇤ 0.0388⇤ 0.0113⇤⇤ 0.00558⇤
X contract intensity (0.0116) (0.0203) (0.00449) (0.00291)
Observations 991 608 1340 1347
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
Having demonstrated that the results pass these basic robustness tests related to the sample of
states and industries used, I now turn to an examination of the possible threats to identification.
2.5 Threats to Identification, Further Robustness Checks and Placebo Tests
2.5.1 Possible Threats to Identification
Recall the main estimating equation (eq 2.1) from above:
gs j = bCourtE f f iciencys ⇤ContractIntensity j+d j+ gs+ es j,
Since I claim no source of demonstrably exogenous variation in state level court efficiency or
industry level contract intensity, I must take concerns regarding omitted variable bias seriously.
However, and as noted previously, I am aided by the addition of state and industry fixed effects,
which preclude the possibility of omitted variables at either the state or industry level alone biasing
the results. Nevertheless, the fixed effects alone do not preclude the possibility that there exist
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omitted variables correlated with the interaction between court efficiency and contract intensity,
and which also effect the economic performance of registered manufacturing firms.
One way this could happen is if court efficiency is correlated with other state level features that
interact positively with industry level contract intensity - or with industry characteristics correlated
with contract intensity. To be specific, here is a list of state level attributes that may conceivably
both correlate with state level court efficiency and interact with industry level contract intensity:
• average income (a likely correlate of good institutions generally)
• corruption (a likely negative correlate of good institutions which may also be harmful for the
enforcement of contracts, especially if corruption extends to the judiciary)
• share of the economy involved in commodities (a high share of output in commodities may
be predictive of poor institutions and poor growth performance for political economy reasons
such as natural resource curse arguments; simultaneously, commodities may be inherently
more homogenous and thus less contract intensive)
• trust/cultural norms (a likely correlate of good institutions which may also enable - or substi-
tute for - the enforcement of legal contracts)
• financial development (a likely correlate of good institutions which may also be particularly
important for contract intensive industries)
• good infrastructure (ditto)
Another, alternative, way in which the results may be biased is if contract intensity is corre-
lated with other industry level characteristics that interact positively with court efficiency (or other
state level attributes correlated with court efficiency). For example, here are some industry level
characteristics which may conceivably fit this description:
• capital intensity (capital investments may require more relationship specific investments and
may interact positively with court efficiency for that and other reasons)
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• complexity (product complexity is likely to be correlated with relationship specificity/contract
intensity (Berkowitz et al. (2006)) and may also benefit from court efficiency (Blanchard and
Kremer (1997)))
• skill level (human capital may similarly require more relationship specific investment and
may also interact positively with court efficiency or other state level variables correlated with
court efficiency such as good institutions generally)
• exportability (may be correlated with contract intensity and may also benefit from court effi-
ciency (e.g.: Ahsan (2013)))
In the next section (2.5.2) I will attempt to systematically include measures of these channels as
well as their interactions with state level court efficiency or industry level contract intensity (as the
case may be) in order to rule out the possibility that the results are being driven by these alternative
mechanisms.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
2.5.2.1 Additional state level controls X Contract intensity
I begin the main robustness analysis by amending the main specification (eq 2.1) to include the ad-
ditional state level characteristics identified above interacted with industry level contract intensity.15
Table 2.11 presents the first such test by including the interaction of logged Net State Domestic
Product (NSDP) with contract intensity as an additional control. This is an important robustness
test since we would expect average state income to be correlated with a host of other types of good
institutions (e.g.: property rights, stable local government, social norms), any one of which may
also be correlated with contract intensity. However we see in the table that the inclusion of this new
interaction has no great effect on the main coefficients of interest (i.e.: the effect of the interaction
between court efficiency and contract intensity).
15Recall that, once again, main effects are omitted due to the inclusion of state and industry fixed effects.
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Next I include an interaction between state level corruption (as measured by Transparency In-
ternational in their “India Corruption Study 2005”16) and industry level contract intensity (see Table
2.12). While corruption does seem to interact negatively with contract intensity to reduce the rate
of profit growth, it does not significantly change the coefficients on the main interaction term of
interest. Table 2.13 includes an interaction between the share of state output in the primary sector
(agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining) and contract intensity. I do this to rule out the possibility
that state characteristics correlated with having a large primary sector are interacting with contract
intensity in such a way as to drive the results. Again, the results are unchanged.
Last, I include all of the above state level characteristics interacted with contract intensity si-
multaneously (Table 2.14). Again, the magnitude of the primary coefficient of interest is largely
unchanged, although we lose statistical significance in columns 1 and 2. There are still some state
level variables that remain to be checked, but the consistency and robustness of the coefficients
of interest in the estimates so far suggest that the results are not being driven by the omission of
variables correlated with state level court efficiency. Next I consider possible omitted variables
correlated with industry level contract intensity.
16The TI corruption measure is based on a survey of perceptions and experience regarding corruption in the public
sector.
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Table 2.11: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved Within One Year (by District/Sessions
Judge) Interacted With Contract Intensity - Additional control: log NSDP per capita Interacted
With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0205⇤⇤ 0.0312⇤⇤ 0.00930⇤⇤ 0.00530⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.00934) (0.0155) (0.00373) (0.00242)
ln NSDP pc X -0.000985 0.00330 -0.00791 -0.00401
contract intensity (0.0215) (0.0324) (0.00834) (0.00539)
Observations 1323 805 1857 1864
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 2.12: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved Within One Year (by District/Sessions
Judge) Interacted With Contract Intensity - Additional control: Corruption Interacted With Contract
Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0220⇤ 0.0338⇤ 0.0163⇤⇤⇤ 0.00968⇤⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.0112) (0.0194) (0.00481) (0.00324)
TI corruption X -0.00968 -0.0262⇤ -0.00264 0.000549
contract intensity (0.00907) (0.0138) (0.00416) (0.00280)
Observations 1031 623 1425 1429
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 2.13: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved Within One Year (by District/Sessions
Judge) Interacted With Contract Intensity - Additional control: Share of Primary Sector Interacted
With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0261⇤⇤ 0.0378⇤⇤ 0.0119⇤⇤⇤ 0.00660⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.0103) (0.0177) (0.00420) (0.00278)
Share Primary -0.0527 -0.151 0.0572 0.0476
Sector X contract intensity (0.113) (0.220) (0.0475) (0.0314)
Observations 1195 719 1663 1670
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 2.14: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved Within One Year (by District/Sessions
Judge) Interacted With Contract Intensity - Additional controls: All State Level Variables Above
Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0202 0.0339 0.0149⇤⇤⇤ 0.00815⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.0129) (0.0212) (0.00511) (0.00348)
ln NSDP pc X -0.000723 -0.0151 -0.0110 -0.00484
contract intensity (0.0460) (0.108) (0.0187) (0.0128)
TI corruption X -0.00983 -0.0232 -0.00573 -0.00223
contract intensity (0.0113) (0.0189) (0.00509) (0.00347)
Share Primary 0.0902 0.0355 0.0593 0.0491
Sector X contract intensity (0.148) (0.402) (0.0613) (0.0417)
Observations 1010 610 1386 1390
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
2.5.2.2 Additional industry level controls X Court Efficiency
The first industry level characteristic I consider is capital intensity. My measure of capital intensity
corresponds to the capital coefficient on a cobb-douglas production function estimated using the
method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) on ASI plant level data.17 I find it important to include
this control as a robustness check since capital intensive industries are also likely to be more contract
intensive (certainly, large investments in capital may require relationship-specific investments), and
17Estimation is done separately by (BEA IO) industry.
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court efficiency may be important to capital intensive industries (if, for example, capital intesive
firms tend to be larger while larger firms make more use of courts). However, the results in Table
2.15 suggest that such a channel is not driving the results, since including the interaction between
court efficiency and capital intensity does not significantly change the coefficient on court efficiency
interacted with contract intensity.
As with the inclusion of additional state level controls, there remain some industry level vari-
ables which I have not yet added to the analysis, but I aim to include these soon. I note here that
all robustness tests performed so far have been passed successfully: none of the several alterna-
tive possible channels considered above seem to be driving the results. In the next subsection, I
perform some placebo tests which provide further assurance that the hypothesized mechanism is
indeed correct.
Table 2.15: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved Within One Year (by District/Sessions
Judge) Interacted With Contract Intensity - Additional control: Capital Intensity Interacted With
Court Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0236⇤⇤⇤ 0.0345⇤⇤ 0.00871⇤⇤ 0.00526⇤⇤
X contract intensity (0.00899) (0.0150) (0.00369) (0.00238)
court efficiency 0.0146 -0.0554 -0.0331 -0.0230
X capital intensity (0.0749) (0.111) (0.0425) (0.0274)
Observations 1384 852 1940 1947
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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2.5.3 Placebo Tests
2.5.3.1 Placebo test 1: all courts including criminal courts
The first placebo test I consider takes advantage of the fact that I have trial duration data for different
types of lower courts. Up until now, I have only been using duration data pertaining to the Court of
the District and Sessions Judge, which hears both civil and criminal cases. Indeed, in conversations
with lawyers based in India, this seems to be the court that would be most likely to hear a case
between two privately owned firms18 over an alleged breach of contract.19 However, the Crime In
India Report makes available court duration pertaining to a number of other lower courts: Additional
Session Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate (I), Judicial Magistrate (II) and Special
Judicial Magistrate. All of these courts, which make up about 90-95% of the total trials for which
there is data in the Crime in India Reports, hear criminal cases exclusively. Therefore, I perform a
robustness test by replacing the previous measure of court efficiency (the fraction of cases resolved
by the District/Session Judge) with a new measure: the fraction of cases resolved in all types of
lower courts. Since the new measure is nearly entirely about criminal courts and not civil ones, it
should not impact the performance of firms concerned about contract enforcment.
The results of this test are provided in Table 2.16 below. Indeed, it appears that the type of
court considered does matter - speedy resolutions in criminal courts do not seem to be associated
with faster growth in contract intensive industries. I view this as strong evidence in favor of the
hypothesized mechanism, as it is very hard to generate a different story which can explain why
the speed of civil courts does matter to growth in contract intensive industries while the speed of
criminal courts does not.
18That is, if they are sole proprietorships or partnerships. Suits pertaining to companies may be more likely to end up
in front of the Company Law Board. In the ASI data over the period 1999-2008, about 50% of plants are part of sole
proprietorships or partnerships, about 27% are part of private limited companies and about 18% are part of public limited
companies.
19I would like to thank Nikunt K. Raval (Advocate) in particular for his time and help in discussing the matters above.
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Table 2.16: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (in all courts including criminal courts)
Within One Year Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
court efficiency 0.0193 0.0398 0.0200 0.0179
(all) X contract intensity (0.0415) (0.0632) (0.0176) (0.0114)
Observations 1454 885 2045 2052
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
2.5.3.2 Placebo Test 2: court efficiency at end period
In the main specification (and, indeed, all of the other tests done so far) I regress the annual growth
rate of dependent variables (such as profit) over the period 1999-2008 against the interaction of
state level court efficiency measured at the beginning of the period (i.e.: in 1999) with industry level
contract intensity, which is time-invariant. In the following test, I correlate growth over the same
period against the interaction of state level court efficiency - now measured at the end of the period
- with industry level contract intensity. If court efficiency changes over time (which it does to some
degree), the level of efficiency at the end of the period should be less important in predicting growth
than efficiency at the beginning of the period. And indeed, this is precisely what we see in Table
2.17.
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Table 2.17: Growth Rate vs Fraction of Cases Resolved (by District/Session Judge) Within One
Year Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
end period court 0.00124 -0.00166 -0.00197 -0.00329
efficiency X contract intensity (0.00788) (0.0102) (0.00411) (0.00271)
Observations 1494 913 2103 2110
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
2.6 Conclusion
In spite of wide recognition that good institutions generally are important for the promotion of
growth, there is less clarity on the relative importance of constituent institutional components. The
value of high quality formal judicial institutions in particular has been disputed. Some have argued
that high quality formal judicial institutions are important (Nunn (2007); Levchenko (2007); Chemin
(2012)) while others have argued that they are not (Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)), suggesting that
informal arrangements may serve as substitutes. Furthermore, most of the papers on the topic so far
have used cross-country data, which is vulnerable to concerns regarding endogeneity and omitted
variables.
In this paper I test whether efficiently functioning formal judicial institutions - as measured by
the speed of courts - are important for the growth of output, profits, employment and net entry in the
Indian registered manufacturing sector. I use state level variation in the average duration of trials in
district courts (an objective measure of court efficiency) and industry level variation in the use of
contracts (from Nunn (2007)) in order to identify the effect in question. The evidence suggests that
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fast courts are a significant determinant of growth among private manufacturing firms in India. In
particular, the point estimates suggest that, for an industry in the 75th percentile of contract intensity,
an improvement of one standard deviation in court efficiency would imply a higher annual growth
rate of gross value added by 1.4 percentage points. The within-country setting for the analysis
allows us to perform a battery of robustness and placebo tests, which demonstrate the robustness of
the results and make it hard to explain them with alternative mechanisms. Based on this analysis, it
seems that informal contracting arrangements provide only a partial substitute for the formal court
system, and that India would therefore enjoy significant economic benefits if it could improve the
efficiency of its courts.
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Appendix
A1: Characteristics of “contract intensive” vs “not contract intensive” industries
Table 2.18: Industry Characteristics by Contract Intensity
contract intensive not contract intensive difference standard error
capital intensity 0.230 0.252 0.021 (0.014)
log employment 3.192 3.300 0.108 (0.103)
log factor cost ratio -0.237 0.045 0.282 (0.150)
market concentration 0.208 0.207 -0.002 (0.028)
avg num inputs (sector) 68.231 65.323 -2.908 (1.702)
HHI inputs (sector) 0.878 0.856 -0.022⇤ (0.010)
ln labor prod 12.116 12.106 -0.010 (0.089)
TFP lev pet 9.838 9.689 -0.149 (0.200)
A2: Level Effects of Court Efficiency
Here I consider whether the interaction between court efficiency and contract intensity may have
effects on the levels of industrial output, rather than on growth rates. First I run a cross sectional
regression over a single time period: 1999. This regression has the form:
ln(outcome)s j = bCourtE f f iciencys ⇤ContractIntensity j+d j+ gs+ es j,
where ln(outcome)s j is the logged value of various outcome variables (total profits, gross value
added, numbers of employees and numbers of factories) in state s and industry j at a single point in
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time (here 1999). The other variables are as measured previously. The results of this regression (in
Table 2.19) are very noisy with no significant effects.
Next I consider a similar specification over multiple time periods:
ln(outcome)s jt = bCourtE f f iciencyst ⇤ContractIntensity j+d j+ gs+at + es jt ,
Now outcomes are measured over time and court efficiency also varies over time. However,
Because I only have court data for the years 1999, 2003 and 2007 for now, the analysis includes
data from only these three waves (data for the remaining years is in the process of being converted).
This work is preliminary and it is not clear that the this specification is correct. However, the results
are reported in Table 2.20, which disagree with the main results: here, changes in court efficiency
over time seem to be associated with lower outcomes in more contract intensive industries. More
work clearly needs to be done to improve the specifications, add years and explain the results.
Table 2.19: Dependent Variable Levels vs “Court Efficiency” Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln gva ln profits ln emp ln num units
court efficiency -0.0663 -0.0492 -0.0323 -0.0137
X contract intensity (0.0425) (0.0472) (0.0324) (0.0219)
Observations 2039 1939 2223 2232
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999 1999 1999 1999
Standard errors in parentheses
State, Industry and Year FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 2.20: Dependent Variable Levels vs “Court Efficiency” Interacted With Contract Intensity
(1999, 2003 and 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln gva ln profits ln emp ln num units
court efficiency -0.0849⇤⇤⇤ -0.0929⇤⇤⇤ -0.0413⇤⇤ -0.0134
X contract intensity (0.0247) (0.0294) (0.0175) (0.0126)
Observations 7834 7146 8582 8597
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999, 2003, 2007 1999, 2003, 2007 1999, 2003, 2007 1999, 2003, 2007
Standard errors in parentheses
State, Industry and Year FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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A3: Alternative Measures of Court Efficiency
Table 2.21: Growth Rate vs “Confidence in Judiciary” Interacted With Contract Intensity (Just Main
Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
(mean) -0.00560 -0.0237 -0.0151 0.00995
conf judiciary (0.0171) (0.0261) (0.0105) (0.00723)
contract 0.0142 0.130 -0.0174 -0.0436
intensity (0.0928) (0.157) (0.0414) (0.0287)
conf judiciary X -0.00149 -0.0329 0.00392 0.00954
contract intensity (0.0227) (0.0380) (0.0102) (0.00706)
Observations 1166 697 1624 1629
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 2.22: Growth Ratevs “Confidence in Judiciary” Interacted With Contract Intensity (State and
Industry Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth in va growth in profits growth in emp growth in num units
conf judiciary X 0.0137 0.0307 0.00474 0.00897
contract intensity (0.0234) (0.0420) (0.00995) (0.00670)
Observations 1166 697 1624 1629
Sample All States All States All States All States
Period 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08 1999-08
Standard errors in parentheses
State and Industry FE included.
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Chapter 3
Distributional Impacts of Dismantling the Small-Scale Reservation Policy in India
(co-authored with Michael Gechter)
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of dismantling a prominent industrial regulation in India and
proposes to use the results of this policy experiment to shed light on 1) firm growth dynamics and 2)
market frictions that affect firms in developing countries. The policy experiment we consider is the
dismantling of the Small Scale Reservation Laws (SSRL). The SSRL mandated that certain goods
be exclusively produced by firms maintaining less than a specified level of investment in plant and
machinery. Starting in 1997, the SSRL policy was gradually dismantled, a process we refer to as
“dereservation.” Each year, a number of goods were removed from the list of reserved products so
that firms producing them were free to exceed the capital thresholds. By 2008, only 20 products
remained reserved out of the approximately 1000 goods that composed the list at its height.
We examine the effect of dereservation of particular goods between 2001 and 2006 by contrast-
ing the evolution of the characteristics of dereserved firms with various control groups that did not
experience dereservation (either firms that were never reserved or that were dereserved prior to 2001
or that remain reserved throughout the period)1. We use a variety of techniques and methodologies
in our study. We begin by using a two period firm level linear difference-in-differences specification
to compare outcomes among firms that received dereservation over the period with those that did
not. In starting wth a DID framework, we are following in the footsteps of several other papers that
have studied the SSRL with a similar framework. We find, however, that the results are sensitive to
the choice of control group (an issue which is not addressed in previous work) and the effects are
weaker when clustering standard errors appropriately.
1We investigate the effect of the 2001 to 2006 dereservation because in 2006 the threshold was increased from Rs.
10,000,000 (roughly $200,000) to Rs. 50,000,000 (about $1 million). Dereservation was thus a different phenomenon
from 2006 onwards since the capital constraint had become much less binding and we would expect expansion even by
still-reserved goods producers.
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Next we employ an event study analysis to determine how the effect of dereservation changes
over time. This analysis reveals an apparent pre-treatment effect of dereservation. If correct, it sug-
gests that dereservation was not applied exogenously and undermines the causal interpretation of
all DID estimates. Finally, we consider graphical non-parametric evidence by looking at the distri-
bution of capital for various groups of firms across time. This analysis suggests that dereservation
may indeed have had a positive effect on the value of capital employed by firms, as dereservation
was followed by the appearance of a mass of firms just above the capital threshold among the dere-
served group in the post period. We find this pattern is strongest for young establishments that start
production in dereserved goods shortly before they get dereserved (i.e. “incumbents”), as opposed
to those firms that enter the product space only after dereservation (“entrants”). This last point sug-
gests that anticipation effects or political economy issues (i.e.: lobbying) may have played a role in
how dereservation was put into practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide a review of related
literature and a brief explanation of the institutional background, respectively. Section 3.4 describes
the data used in our analysis and provides summary statistics and important definitions. Our empir-
ical analysis begins in earnest with Section 3.5, which presents results from a linear difference in
differences approach to estimation. Section 3.6 follows with an event study analysis, providing a
more dynamic look at dereservation. In Section 3.7, we provide nonparametric graphical evidence
of the effect of dereservation, following which Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature
The magnitude of the reservation and dereservation policies have prompted substantial interest from
the academic community. From a macroeconomic perspective, there has been particular interest in
investigating the role reservation may have played in misallocation of resources across firms as in
Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Bollard et al. (2013) perform industry-level regression analysis and find
that the fraction of output dereserved does not correlate with reallocation to more productive firms.
Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) theoretically examine the problem of occupational choice in
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a dual sector economy, with quantitative results calibrated to match the Indian reservation context.
In their model, removing reservation policy can generate substantial gains in TFP.
From a microeconometric perspective, closer to our analysis in this paper, two working pa-
pers investigate the process of dereservation within a difference-in-differences program evaluation
framework. Tewari andWilde (2014) argue that dereservation led to increases in total factor produc-
tivity, but that this increase was driven entirely by multiproduct firms that expanded their product
scope into industries with large fractions of dereserved goods. Martin et al. (2014) focus on in-
vestigating the within-plant effect of dereservation, finding small or negative effects on outcomes
such as employment for firms already producing a dereserved good at the time of dereservation (in-
cumbents) and positive effects on outcomes for firms that only begin production of the good after
dereservation (entrants). Though similar to Tewari and Wilde (2014) and Martin et al. (2014) in
certain respects, our paper differs in methodology, objectives, and findings.
While Tewari and Wilde (2014) and Martin et al. (2014) operate within a linear, parametric
DID framework, we also examine the effects of the policy non-parametrically. Our non-parametric
approach reveals threshold-specific effects of the policy that are more difficult to explain away as
artifacts of a particular specification than linear difference-in-differences results. Furthermore, our
own parametric specifications show that DID estimates of the effect of dereservation are highly
sensitive to the estimation sample used, particularly with respect to the factories considered for
comparison with the dereserved plants (an issue which is not raised in preceding papers). In contrast,
our non-parametric estimates for the average effect of dereservation on capital and labor are robust
to alternative choices of comparison groups. Finally, by revealing possible pretreatment effects, our
event study analysis suggests that any linear DID strategy (including most of the preceding papers
on the topic) is likely to provide biased estimates.
Our preliminary findings also contrast with what the previous papers had found: we find the
strongest effects of dereservation seem to be coming from “incumbents” rather than “entrants” into
the reserved product space. Indeed, entrants seem to be constrained in size in comparison with
incumbents. This and other observations have prompted us to explore the role that market frictions
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can play in explaining the current facts in currently ongoing work.
3.3 Institutional Background: Small Scale Reservation in India
Since early after its Independence, most Indian governments have considered the promotion of the
Small Scale Industry (SSI) sector to be an important policy objective. The notion was that numerous
small enterprises - as opposed to fewer large ones - would generate a more equitable distribution
of wealth and economic power, as well as provide employment opportunities on a large scale with
the smallest amount of capital - a scarce resource in all poor countries, including India. Among the
policies enacted to achieve this objective were the Small Scale Reservation Laws (SSRL).
The SSRL maintained a list of products that could only be produced by enterprises below a
certain capital threshold. By constraining the use of capital, the laws were meant to keep industry
labor intensive, so that jobs would be available for the unskilled labor leaving the agricultural sec-
tor. At the height of the reservation policy, approximately 1000 goods were reserved, making up
nearly 25 percent of total manufacturing output (Tewari and Wilde (2014)). Criticism of the SSRL
eventually grew, particularly after the liberalization reforms of 1991, since the laws were argued to
make Indian industry less efficient and therefore less competitive with foreign producers who could
now enter the Indian market. In response to these criticisms, the Indian government initiated the
process of dereservation.
The definition of the Small Scale Industry (SSI) Sector, the firms allowed to produce reserved
goods, has undergone several changes over time. The definition was first set out in the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, to include all “industrial undertaking[s] in which the
investment in fixed assets in plant and machinery whether held on ownership terms on lease or on
hire” was less than a prescribed threshold (National Productivity Council (2009)).
This threshold was revised on a number of occasions - usually upward, with the goal of keeping
up with inflation, although the changes do not track inflation closely. The nomenclature has also
changed, so that what were previously known as “Small Scale Industries” are now referred to in
government documents as “Small andMicro Enterprises”. The relevant changes in the SSI definition
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over the recent period are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Historical definition of Small Scale Industry Sector
Period: 1997-1999 1999-2006 2006-present
Capital Limit 30 10 50
(Millions of Rs.):
Nomenclature: “Small Scale Industry” “Small Scale Industry” “Small Enterprise”
Although the SSI sector was the focus of a large array of policies (including preferred access to
government contracts and finance), product reservation was probably the most controversial of all
SSI policies. As previously mentioned, the policy required all firms producing certain items to be
classified as SSI enterprises (or as “Small Enterprises”, in more recent nomenclature) - and thus to
maintain a level of investment in plant and machinery less than the thresholds given in Table 3.1. If
an enterprise was already above the capital threshold when a good it was producing was placed on
the reservation list, it could be grandfathered in and allowed to remain in production - although its
capital and production levels would be capped at their current levels. Another exception to the rule
was provided for enterprises that exported 50% or more of their production (National Productivity
Council (2009), p 23).2
The policy of reservation began in 1967, when 47 items were placed on the SSI reservation list.
By 1978, this list had grown to 807 items (National Productivity Council (2009), p. 23). The exact
rationale behind how and when certain items were placed on the reserved list is not entirely clear,
although government reports argue that “[t]he overwhelming consideration for Reservation of an
item was its suitability and feasibility for being made in the small scale sector without compromising
quality aspects” (National Productivity Council (2009)). The process by which certain goods were
dereserved is similarly unclear, although it seems the decisions were taken in consultation with
certain members of industry. Furthermore, we read that:
2In our reading of the law, the investment limit is meant to apply at the enterprise/firm level, while our data are at the
establishment/factory level. Most firms in India are single establishment firms, but even if they weren’t, the limit on firm
size is a de facto limit on factory size (since you cannot exceed the limit at the factory level without also exceeding the
limit at the firm level).
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“The Advisory Committee makes its recommendations for reservation/de- reservation in light
of the factors like economies of scale; level of employment; possibility of encouraging and diffusing
entrepreneurship in industry; prevention of concentration of economic power and any other factor
which the Committee may think appropriate.” (Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
(2013), p.40)
Therefore, the process of dereservation may not have been entirely independent of anticipated
future product characteristics, although the precise rationale behind the decision to dereserve certain
items rather than others at certain points in time is certainly hard to discern (Tewari and Wilde
(2014)).
3.4 Data and Group Definitions
Our main source of data on factory level outcomes is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The
ASI covers the organized manufacturing sector in India, where organized manufacturing refers to es-
tablishments registered with the state Directorate of Factories.3 The ASI is representative at the state
level, with establishments employing less than 100 workers sampled from the listing maintained by
the state Directorates of Factories and a complete enumeration of establishments employing more
than 100 workers (known as the census sector).4 We make use of the 2001-2008 waves of the ASI,
although most of our analysis is focused on the period 2001-2006. The year of a wave refers to the
fiscal year, as defined by the Indian government, so that 2001 refers to the fiscal year from April 1st,
2000 to March 31st, 2001. Establishments present in repeated waves of the survey can be tracked
through a unique identifier. Establishments in the ASI may list several goods produced, each iden-
tified by ASICC code. We begin our analysis in 2001 because ASICC product code information
is very poor further back in time and we end the analysis in the 2006 because of the change in
eligibility criteria that occured then.
3According to the Factories Act (1947), a factory is required to be registered with the Directorate (and be thus classified
as “organized”) if it has at least 10 workers and uses power (or if has at least 20 workers and does not use power).
4In three waves (1997/1998 to 1999/2000), the census sector includes only those with 200 or more workers, but most
of the data we use come from after this period.
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We constructed a mapping between the 8 digit 1987 National Industrial Classification (NIC)
codes used by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME)5 to identify reserved
products in official documents and the Annual Survey of Industries Commodity Classification (AS-
ICC) codes used to identify products in the Indian establishment-level surveys used in the analysis
and described below. We make our mapping from 1987 NIC codes to ASICC codes because the
official concordance from 1987 NIC codes to 1998 NIC codes (which can be mapped through an
official concordance to 2004 NIC codes) is from 3-digit 1987 NIC code to 4-digit 1998 NIC codes.
The MSMEMinistry identifies products by their 8-digit 1987 NIC code, so the official concordance
is too coarse a mapping. Our basic procedure, similar to the approach described in Martin et al.
(2014), is then to manually map 8-digit 1987 NIC codes to 5-digit ASICC codes based on product
descriptions. In many cases, it was helpful to use an official concordance between 2004 NIC codes
and ASICC codes to help pick out the appropriate ASICC codes. The final mapping identifies the
ASICC code for all products reserved in 1997, when the number of reserved products was greatest.
In the analysis below, we will find it helpful to distinguish between four categories of firms,
one of which experienced dereservation over the period we study while the others did not. These
categories are:
• “dereserved during” (or “treated”) - these are factories producing an item on the reservation
list in 2001 that will be dereserved between 2001 and 2006 (the main period of our analysis).
To be clear, establishments in this category are “reserved” (i.e.: subject to the SSI constraints)
in 2001 but are “dereserved” by 2006.
• “never reserved” - factories whose goods have never been on the reservation list and hence
never experience dereservation. We use this group as the primary control group in our analy-
sis.
• “already dereserved” - factories whose reserved goods have all been dereserved by 2001 (i.e.:
before we start our analysis).
5Prior to 2001, the MSME ministry was known as the Ministry of Small Scale Industries.
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• “always reserved” - factories whose reserved goods have not yet been dereserved by 2006
(i.e.: they remain reserved over the full period of our analysis).
The first group experience the treatment of dereservation over the period in question and we hence
refer to them as “dereserved during” or “treated”. The other 3 groups do not experience dereserva-
tion over the period in question, and can thus be considered alternative control groups. However,
the reasons for not experiencing dereservation are different for each control group and it is not clear,
prima facie, which is the most appropriate proxy for the treated group in the absence of dereser-
vation. In section 3.5, we will consider how our results differ when using these alternative control
groups and what that implies for our main analysis.
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Table 3.2: 2001 producer group means
dereserved during never reserved already dereserved always reserved
num total employees 103.2 74.31 53.39 53.12
(321.7) (469.3) (168.9) (182.9)
ln fix cap 14.09 13.81 13.38 13.06
(2.542) (2.459) (2.109) (2.396)
ln capital to labor 10.70 10.62 10.13 9.982
(1.887) (1.947) (1.720) (2.122)
factor cost ratio 2.981 3.245 2.279 2.315
(5.219) (5.503) (3.708) (4.604)
cap int nic 0.327 0.310 0.349 0.311
(0.137) (0.110) (0.0865) (0.107)
cap int rs4 0.219 0.303 0.303 0.219
(0) (0.0185) (0.0484) (0)
labor int nic 0.671 0.686 0.524 0.684
(0.120) (0.109) (0.126) (0.109)
labor int rs4 0.683 0.717 0.674 0.683
(0) (0.0116) (0.00495) (0)
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤ p< 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.001
Table 3.2 shows 2001 sample-weighted mean producer attributes (with standard deviations in
parentheses) for the four groups defined above. From the table it seems that the treated group
seems to be of larger scale than all other comparison groups, including “never reserved”.6 Although
6This in itself is a curious fact and seems to contradict claims that goods were chosen for reservation based on their
“suitability and feasibility for being made in the small scale sector without compromising quality aspects” (National
Productivity Council (2009)).
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the difference in means is large and statistically significant7, it still appears that, among the three
potential control groups, “never reserved” establishments seem to be the most appropriate group to
use in comparison to the “dereserved during/treated” establishments. First, Table 3.2 shows that,
for a number of important attributes, never reserved establishments have closer average values to
the treatment group than do the other potential control groups (“already dereserved” and “always
reserved”) in 2001. For the validity of a DID strategy, we would like to ensure comparability not
only in levels of attributes such as logged capital but also in trends. In particular, a good control
group will share a common trend with the treated group before treatment. We attempt to check this
assumption in our event study analysis.
Also of note is that, in spite of the difference in mean characteristics between treated and never
reserved establishments, the distributions of certain characteristics look quite similar for the two
groups. For example, the distribution of factor cost ratios are exceedingly similar for the two groups
of producers in 2001, as shown in figure 3.1. Our results in this and subsequent sections are robust
to restricting our analysis to producers of certain product categories8 with fractions of producers
of goods to be dereserved lying in specified intervals. Setting a minimum fraction of goods to be
dereserved makes it more likely that treatment and control group producers experience the same
demand and supply shocks. This must be balanced against product classes where the fraction of
producers to be dereserved is sufficiently large that we are concerned that dereservation would have
effects on never-reserved goods producers, for example by bidding up the price of inputs. There-
fore, we have experimented with providing minimum and maximum fractions of dereserved goods
producers, with qualitatively similar results9. Appendix 3.10 shows the fractions of establishments
in each 1-digit product category in 2001.
7Not reported here.
8We use 1-, 2- and 3-digit ASICC codes to delineate product categories.
9Specifically, we have tried excluding producers of goods with less than 5 and 10% of producers manufacturing
dereserved goods and well as excluding producers of goods with less than 5% and more than 20%.
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Figure 3.1: 2001 density of log(factor cost ratio)
3.5 Linear Difference in Differences
In this section we study dereservation through a difference in differences linear regression frame-
work. All specifications are at the establishment level and are run over two-periods (2001 and
2006).10 The treatment group consists of firms producing goods that were dereserved over the pe-
riod, and treatment is the combination of being in this group in the post period. We provide results
using the three control groups defined earlier - and find notably different effects in each case. All
regressions include (3 digit) ASICC subdivision fixed effects - so that the treatment picks up within
product class effects and to minimize the possibility that any results are due to differences in the
types of products dereserved. Standard errors are clustered at the ASICC level, which is in contrast
to all previous studies, which cluster standard errors at the establishment level.
The results of the regressions are provided in Tables 3.3 - 3.5. We find very large point estimates
10Recall that we begin our analysis in 2001 because asicc product code information is very poor further back in time
and we stop the analysis in the 2006 because of the change in eligibility criteria that occured then.
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of the effect of dereservation on capital when the control group is never reserved firms and always
reserved firms, although the effect is only significant in the latter case.11 When the control group is
always dereserved firms, dereservation seems to be associated with increases in output, value added,
productivity and a simple proxy for the extent of vertical integration (value added/total output).
Putting aside the question of which control group - if any - would be the most suitable comparison,
we now turn to the question of whether the main requirement of a difference in differences study
(namely, the common trend assumption) is satisfied in this case.
Table 3.3: Outcomes vs Dereservation Status - control group is never reserved firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln fix cap ln emp ln output ln gva ln VI proxy ln manuf prod
deres 0.308 0.0818 0.0595 0.0496 0.00290 -0.0107
during X post (0.318) (0.106) (0.170) (0.163) (0.0575) (0.0869)
deres 0.178 0.145⇤ 0.294⇤⇤ 0.282⇤⇤ 0.0295 0.141⇤
during (0.183) (0.0806) (0.125) (0.111) (0.0413) (0.0724)
post -0.234⇤⇤⇤ 0.0950⇤⇤⇤ 0.143⇤⇤⇤ -0.270⇤⇤⇤ -0.423⇤⇤⇤ -0.384⇤⇤⇤
(0.0307) (0.0161) (0.0278) (0.0290) (0.0194) (0.0210)
cons 14.98 6.872 21.33⇤⇤⇤ 19.39 -1.942 12.52⇤⇤⇤
(.) (.) (0.000124) (.) (.) (0.000106)
N 49348 50997 50307 44360 45606 45262
Standard errors in parentheses
control group is never reserved
Regressions include asicc subdivision FEs
Standard errors clustered at asicc code level
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
11Both estimates are significant when standard errors are not clustered.
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Table 3.4: Outcomes vs Dereservation Status - control group is always dereserved firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln fix cap ln emp ln output ln gva ln VI proxy ln manuf prod
deres 0.0431 0.102 0.331⇤⇤ 0.428⇤⇤ 0.329⇤⇤ 0.370⇤⇤⇤
during X post (0.184) (0.0860) (0.148) (0.177) (0.137) (0.116)
deres 0.387 -0.00906 -0.0212 -0.136 -0.149 -0.121
during (0.252) (0.116) (0.191) (0.192) (0.112) (0.111)
post -0.196⇤⇤ 0.0274 -0.230⇤⇤ -0.728⇤⇤⇤ -0.746⇤⇤⇤ -0.829⇤⇤⇤
(0.0851) (0.0639) (0.0976) (0.144) (0.135) (0.0933)
cons 15.97⇤⇤⇤ 5.209⇤⇤⇤ 17.92⇤⇤⇤ 14.66⇤⇤⇤ -3.255⇤⇤⇤ 9.453⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000601) (0.0000110) (0.0000325) (0.0000209) (0.00000803) (0.0000129)
N 7632 8101 8042 6827 7062 6927
Standard errors in parentheses
control group is always dereserved
Regressions include asicc subdivision FEs
Standard errors clustered at asicc code level
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 3.5: Outcomes vs Dereservation Status - control group is always reserved firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln fix cap ln emp ln output ln gva ln VI proxy ln manuf prod
deres 0.539⇤ 0.161 0.264 0.261 0.0524 0.133
during X post (0.275) (0.0992) (0.167) (0.164) (0.0715) (0.0938)
deres 0.694⇤⇤ 0.308⇤⇤⇤ 0.445⇤⇤ 0.393⇤⇤ -0.00805 0.139
during (0.306) (0.110) (0.181) (0.176) (0.0565) (0.0929)
post -0.461⇤⇤⇤ 0.00172 -0.0587 -0.456⇤⇤⇤ -0.474⇤⇤⇤ -0.509⇤⇤⇤
(0.0736) (0.0406) (0.0577) (0.0628) (0.0470) (0.0459)
cons 19.52⇤⇤⇤ 6.052⇤⇤⇤ 20.67 19.84 -0.836 13.79
(0.0000349) (0.0000156) (.) (.) (.) (.)
N 6270 6577 6520 5881 6096 6024
Standard errors in parentheses
control group is always reserved
Regressions include asicc subdivision FEs
Standard errors clustered at asicc code level
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
3.6 Industry Level Event Study Analyses
In order to check for common pretrends and investigate the effects of dereservation in a more dy-
namic way, we run an event study analysis. Note that the set-up for this analysis differs somewhat
from the preceding. Namely, the analysis is done at the industry level (i.e.: ASICC code level),
rather than the firm level. Treated observations are simply those industries that were ever-reserved,
and not just those that were “dereserved during” 2001-2006, because it provides more years pre and
post treatment for analysis. As a consequence there is only one control group: industries that were
never-reserved.
Our methodology is as follows: we plot average outcome values for treated industries for several
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years before and after treatment, while using year dummies to capture trends in the control (i.e.:
never reserved) industries over time. The analysis corresponds to the following specification:
yit = gtreati+dt +
b
Â
k=a
bkageitk ⇤ treati+ eit ,
where yit is log capital for industry i in year t, treati is an indicator for ever-reserved industries,
ageitk is a dummy for the number of years before or since dereservation (k) for a particular industry
i in year t, and bk is the coefficient of interest: the effect of dereservation k periods before or after
treatment.
The following graph (Figure 3.2) of the estimated bk coefficients is preliminary but it suggests
not only a possible treatment effect but also a pretreatment effect. If correct, it would appear that
industries to be dereserved were indeed on different trajectories than industries that were not. This
may have been due to the fact that the government prioritized certain industries for dereservation
according to growth potential or it may have been due to political economy issues, such as firms
entering an industry and then lobbying for its dereservation (an interpretation we will provide further
support for in what follows).
105
Figure 3.2: Event Analysis - log(capital) over time
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3.7 Nonparametric/Graphical Analysis
Now we return to the empirical setup from Section 3.5 and earlier, wherein analysis is conducted at
the firm level across the four groups of firms defined above, with firms “dereserved during” 2001-
2006 as the treatment group. We attempt to shed more light on the topic by looking at the problem
nonparametrically. In particular, we look at the distribution of capital for treated and control groups
before and after dereservation. In what follows, we use “never reserved” as the control group,
although the analysis is similar with other control groups.
Figure 3.3 shows kernel density plots of the distributions of capital (nominal value, logged) for
never reserved establishments and dereserved during/treated establishments in 2001 (i.e.: before
treatment). As we noted earlier, the plants producing never-reserved goods are - surprisingly -
slightly smaller than those producing reserved goods. The vertical line shows the threshold level
of capital stock at which the reservation laws are meant to be binding. To reiterate, according to
the law, only firms smaller than this threshold are allowed to produce reserved goods (with some
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exceptions, which we will address shortly).
It is striking then, that a significant portion of the “dereserved during” distribution lies above the
threshold (about 15% of plants). This suggests that the regulations were not strictly enforced. Not
only that, but both distributions appear to be relatively smooth, including around the threshold.12
The smoothness of the distributions around the threshold and the substantial mass of plants operating
above the threshold may lead observers to question whether the regulations were actually binding. In
fact, doubts about the extent to which the regulation was binding were a feature of policy discussions
at the time of dereservation (National Productivity Council (2009)). It is still possible that the
regulations affected firm decisions without leading to visible distortions in the distribution around
the threshold. This could happen if, for example, the regulations were enforced by corrupt inspectors
who allowed firms to produce reserved goods upon payment of bribes and were more likely to
visit larger firms so that firm costs were smoothly increasing functions of a firm’s size. Indeed,
we provide evidence in the subsequent analysis that producers of reserved goods did seem to be
constrained, making the smoothness of the distribution of capital stock of reserved goods producers
a puzzle to be explained in our ongoing work.
12There were certain exceptions to the reservation law: firms above the capital threshold were allowed to produce
reserved goods if they were grandfathered in or if they exported more than 50% of their output. To check whether these
caveats explain the mass of firms above the threshold, we look at the distribution of treated firms using only those firms
with initial product years post 1978 (when most new products were added to the reservation list). Firms started after this
year could not have been “grandfathered” in. The results in Figure 3.9 of the Appendix show that there is still a mass
of firms above the threshold - and no discontinuity around the threshold. We do not have data on export shares, so we
cannot check that exception. Another possible explanation of the observed mass is the following: our reading of the law
is that firms cannot exceed the capital threshold if they produce even one reserved product. But it is conceivable that the
law is only applied to firms that primarily make reserved products. To check this, we modify the set of firms further to
include only those treated firms that report producing reserved products exclusively. Again, the mass above the threshold
remains - although it is considerably diminished.
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Figure 3.3: 2001 density of log(capital)
While, Figure 3.3 displays kernel density plots of the distributions of log capital for never re-
served firms and treated firms before treatment, Figure 3.4 shows capital distributions for these two
categories in 2006, after treatment. In contrast to figure 3.3, the distribution of capital for treated
(i.e.: previously reserved, now dereserved) firms shows a bulge to the right of the capital threshold,
and is notable for two reasons. First, we argue that the figure provides non-parametric evidence of
an effect of dereservation. This is because it is difficult to come up with other explanations for why
the distortion observed in the distribution occurs just above the regulatory threshold and only among
treated firms. Second, the disproportionate expansion of a portion of the distribution of previously
reserved firms suggests that only some producers took advantage of the dereservation.
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Figure 3.4: 2006 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.5 probes this last point further, separating the dereserved plants into two categories:
• “incumbents” who produced a dereserved product before it was dereserved.
• “entrants” who only produce a dereserved product after it is dereserved.
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Figure 3.5: 2006 density of log(capital) - incumbents and entrants
Note that the terms entrant and incumbent refer to entry into the product market of reserved
goods - rather than the start-up of a new firm.13 We see that the bulge in the dereserved distribution
in figure 3.4 is a result of a distortion in the distribution of capital for incumbent firms. It seems
natural to expect that firms entering the newly dereserved product markets would enter at large scale,
thereby taking advantage of the dereservation. Entering firms presumably include firms who would
have selected out of the reserved sector as a result of being sufficiently productive that their optimal
scale exceeds the threshold.14 Then again, it could be that entering firms start small and begin to
grow and surpass the threshold only in time.15
More nuance is provided in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Figure 3.6 breaks down treated and never
reserved establishments according to whether they are “young” (i.e.: established after 2001) or
“old” (established before 2001). This categorization relies on the fact that establishments in the
13This terminology follows that of Martin et al. (2014).
14Consider a framework such as Lucas (1978).
15In ongoing work, we seek to shed light on this puzzle by means of a dynamic structural model of firm growth with
credit constraints.
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ASI were required to report their initial production year. What we see is that the bulge in the
density in the post-period occurs only for young establishments. This may seems at odds with our
earlier result suggesting that the biggest effect is seen for incumbents. Figure 3.7 therefore breaks
down the treated group into four mutually exclusive groups: old incumbents, young encumbents,
old entrants and young entrants. Recall that entrant and incumbent refer to entry in the reserved
product space rather than starting up a new establishments. An entrant is an establishment that only
produced dereserved goods after they were dereserved. It may be old or young. An incumbent is an
establishment that produced dereserved products prior to their being dereserved. In this sense they
are incumbents in the product space.
The biggest effects are now seen amongst the “young incumbents”. These establishments are
young because they did not exist prior to 2001 and they are incumbents because they have produced
a reserved product before it was dereserved. This combination of attributes suggests that they may
be first-movers, or early-movers. Anticipating dereservation, they start production of reserved goods
while the goods are still reserved, and then expand rapidly immediately following dereservation. In
fact, such phenomena are in line with an interpretation in which these select establishments are
politically powerful and are able to influence dereservation through lobbying, or else have access
to priviledged information and can anticipate dereservation better than others. Either way, if such
behaviour is driving the distortions in the distributions, it is further evidence that a linear difference-
in-differences estimation method may be inappropriate.
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Figure 3.6: 2006 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.7: 2006 density of log(capital)
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3.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided both parametric and non-parametric evidence of the impact of
removing restrictions on the value of capital stock for producers of specific goods in India over the
period from 2001 to 2006. It seems that the removal of restrictions went along with an expansion
in the value of the capital stock employed by producers of the newly-unrestricted goods, although
DID estimates of the effect may be biased and are in any case very sensitive to the choice of control
group (which is not an obvious one). In contrast to the previous literature, we find that whatever
expansion occured appears to have come mostly from young firms who start production of reserved
goods just before dereservation, pointing to possible political economy effects. Our estimates of the
effect on employment are more muted, but it seems that the worst fear of policymakers, a fall in
employment, did not occur over the period of our study.
Furthermore, our analysis has also uncovered a number of puzzling phenomena, including the
fact that the distribution of the value of capital stock appears to have been undistorted by product
reservation around the capital threshold in the period prior to dereservation. In the next stages of
this project, we aim to shed light on these peculiarities, determine whether and to what extent any
parametric estimates of the effect of dereservation may be valid and dig further into any political
economy effects.
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3.9 Appendix: Linear Differences in Differences - the effect of varying the estimation
sample
3.9.1 Within firm effects
All specifications consider two-period linear difference-in-difference specifications with firm fixed
effects. 2001 is the pre-treatment period and 2006 is the post-treatment period.
Table 3.6: Capital vs Dereservation Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
dereserved 0.0949 0.0804 0.469⇤ 0.0751
(0.0711) (0.0769) (0.269) (0.0613)
2006.year 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.137 0.0919⇤⇤⇤
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.34⇤⇤⇤ 13.21⇤⇤⇤ 13.16⇤⇤⇤ 13.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.0110) (0.0131) (0.0220) (0.00891)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 3.7: Capital vs Dereservation Status (interacted with readymade garments indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
dereserved 0.0912 0.0776 0.732⇤⇤ 0.0562
(0.0844) (0.0886) (0.301) (0.0707)
readymade -0.215 -0.267 0.120 -0.226
(0.192) (0.200) (0.441) (0.192)
deresXreadymade 0.0299 0.0294 -0.393 0.0792
(0.149) (0.149) (0.252) (0.141)
2006.year 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.137 0.0919⇤⇤⇤
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.35⇤⇤⇤ 13.22⇤⇤⇤ 13.14⇤⇤⇤ 13.39⇤⇤⇤
(0.0122) (0.0159) (0.0287) (0.00966)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 3.8: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent status)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.0469 0.0386 0 -0.199
(0.156) (0.157) (.) (0.147)
deresXinc 0.123⇤ 0.107 0.469⇤ 0.134⇤⇤
(0.0646) (0.0711) (0.269) (0.0645)
2006.year 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ -0.137 0.0922⇤⇤⇤
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.35⇤⇤⇤ 13.22⇤⇤⇤ 13.22⇤⇤⇤ 13.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.0184) (0.0277) (0.00909) (0.0119)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 3.9: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent status -
excluding readymade garments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.0407 0.0320 0 -0.241
(0.161) (0.161) (.) (0.157)
deresXinc 0.137⇤ 0.121 0.728⇤⇤ 0.148⇤⇤
(0.0729) (0.0782) (0.301) (0.0728)
2006.year 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.137 0.0926⇤⇤⇤
(0.0175) (0.0377) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.34⇤⇤⇤ 13.20⇤⇤⇤ 13.19⇤⇤⇤ 13.39⇤⇤⇤
(0.0179) (0.0268) (0.00597) (0.0114)
N 58489 33746 25534 56271
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
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Table 3.10: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent status -
including only readymade garments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.693 0.874⇤⇤ 0 0.693
(0.424) (0.411) (.) (0.424)
deresXinc 0.564 0.745⇤⇤ 0.206 0.564
(0.351) (0.336) (0.159) (0.351)
2006.year -0.366 -0.547⇤ 0 -0.366
(0.330) (0.313) (.) (0.330)
cons 13.16⇤⇤⇤ 13.15⇤⇤⇤ 13.21⇤⇤⇤ 13.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.0330) (0.0323) (0.000429) (0.0330)
N 25904 25889 25611 25904
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
⇤ p< 0.10, ⇤⇤ p< 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p< 0.01
3.10 Appendix: 2001 fractions of plants producing in each 1-digit ASICC product
category by group
Product category Already
dereserved
Dereserved
2001-2006
Always
reserved
Never
reserved
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Animal, Vegetable,
Horticulture, Forestry
Products, Beverages,
Tobacco And Pan Masala
And Non-Edible
Water/Spirit & Alcohol
68.6 2 20.48 20.62
Ores, Minerals, Mineral
Fuels, Lubricants, Gas &
Electricity
0 2.19 3.56 8.43
Chemical And Allied
Products
0.01 21.5 18.05 7.19
Rubber, Plastic, Leather 4.27 30.92 6.91 6.73
Wood, Cork, Thermocol &
Paper
0.18 6.44 9.61 6.66
Textile And Textile
Articles
23.36 9.75 1.65 10.12
Base Metals & Machinery
Equipment And Parts
Thereof, Excluding
Transport Equipment
2.38 21.95 29.89 25.97
Railways, Airways, Ships
& Road Surface Transport
And Related Equipment &
Parts
0.08 0 2.93 1.91
Other Manufactured
Articles And Services
1.12 5.26 6.92 12.37
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3.11 Appendix: example of dereservation within a 3-digit ASICC product category
Table 3.12: Product class (subdivision) 443 - LEATHER FOOTWEAR & PARTS THEREOF
code product name year of dereservation
44301 CHAPPALS/SANDALS, LEATHER 2003
44302 FOOT WEAR, BOOT never reserved
44303 FOOT WEAR, OTHERS, LEATHER 2001
44305 SHOE UPPER LEATHER SHEET never reserved
44306 SHOE UPPER, LEATHER 2003
44311 SHOE SOLE, LEATHER 1999
44312 MID SOLE SHEET, LEATHER never reserved
44313 INSOLE / OUTSOLE, LEATHER never reserved
44315 EYE LETS, LEATHER never reserved
44316 SHOE LINER, LEATHER never reserved
44389 FOOTWEAR, LEATHER & PARTS , N.E.C never reserved
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3.12 Appendix: Further Nonparametric/Graphical Analysis
3.12.1 Pre-period (2001)
Figure 3.8: 2001 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.9: 2001 density of log(capital)
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3.12.2 Post-period (2006)
3.12.3 Post-period (2008)
Figure 3.10: 2008 density of log(capital)
3.13 Analysis of Exit
Table 3.13 shows the total number of factories operating according to ASI estimates in 2001 and
2006. Exit rates, derived by taking the percentage change in the number of factories in 2006 after
subtracting factories with opening dates after 2001, are given in the third column. We see that there
were differences in exit rates between producers of dereserved products and already-dereserved
products, but that exit rates were similar between dereserved and never- and always-reserved prod-
ucts. At a first pass, dereservation does not seem to be associated with higher or lower levels of exit
in comparison with most of the groups that did not experience dereservation over the period.
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Table 3.13: Number of Factories Over The Period: 2001 and 2006
Total number in
2001
Total number in
2006
(% change)
Total number in
2006 - excluding
new factories
(% change)
Always reserved 7379 7687 6482
(4.2) (-12.2)
Always dereserved 11138 13398 10535
(20.3) (-5.4)
Never reserved 90883 95064 77122
(4.6) (-15.1)
Dereserved during 2935 3226 2496
(treatment) (9.9) (-15.0)
3.14 Appendix: Changes-in-Changes Analysis
3.14.1 Empirical specification
We use the Changes-in-Changes (CIC) model of Athey and Imbens (2006)to estimate the effect
of dereservation on the distribution of producer attributes. To capture the effect of time (from
2001 to 2006) on the distribution of attributes, we use the evolution of the distribution of attributes
for a comparison group of producers (alternately “never reserved” and “always reserved” goods
producers).
In our context, the CIC approach is based on the assumption that, in the absence of dereservation,
an establishment attribute is generated by a function of the following form.
Yt = ht(U)
ht(·) is strictly increasing inU , a producer-specific unobserved attribute. In the absence of dereser-
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vation, we must further assume that the distribution ofU for producers of both sets of goods (dere-
served from 2001 to 2006 and the comparison group) is unaffected by time. These two assumptions
allow us to recover the distribution of Yt under reservation for dereserved goods producers in period
t 0 as FYt |G=d
⇣
F( 1)Yt |G=n
 
FYt0 |G=n (yt 0 |G= n) |G= d
 ⌘
where G= {c,d} is a random variable indexing
producers of comparison and reserved/dereserved goods, respectively. We use this expression to
compute the counterfactual distribution of producer attributes under product reservation in 2006 for
dereserved products.
3.14.2 Results
Table 3.14 and figure 3.11 show the result of applying the distributional analysis described in the
previous section, using never reserved goods producers as the control group. The observed dis-
tributions in figure 3.11 are as in figures 3.3 and 3.4: we see again that reserved firms are larger
than never reserved firms in 2001 (bold lines) and 2006 (fine lines). Dereserved (to be dereserved
in 2001) establishments’ distributions of capital stock are shown with solid lines, never-reserved
with dashed lines. The solid line with asterisk markers represents the counterfactual outcome for
producers of dereserved goods, had the goods not been dereserved. The counterfactual is computed
by assuming that the distribution of capital for reserved products would have undergone the same
transformation from 2001 to 2006 as the distribution for never reserved products. The average effect
of dereservation is estimated at 0.2308 and is significant at the 10% level.
Table 3.14: CIC results: dereserved vs. never reserved
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output) log(real wage)
0.2308* 0.0806 0.0569 -0.0390
(0.1202) (0.0746) (0.1105) (0.0298)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure described
in Athey and Imbens (2006).
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of value of log(real capital stock), 2001 (before) and 2006 (after) dere-
served and never reserved
We note that the effect on log(capital) is twice as large as the largest effect on capital reported
in Martin et al. (2014), a fact we attribute to their effect being on capital in any year following
dereservation. If the effect of dereservation on capital is increasing over time, as we show is the
case in the following subsection, their effect may place more weight on smaller, short-run impacts
while our estimates place more weight on the medium-run impacts of the policy.
The results for other outcomes are smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. There
is weak evidence that plants expanded their use of labor along with capital, which would allay
policymaker’s fears of a decrease in employment following a reallocation of resources from smaller,
more labor-intensive plants to larger, more capital-intensive plants. Given the shape of the effect
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on the distribution of capital, we conjecture that it may be possible to gain power to investigate the
effect of the deregulation on other outcomes with this comparison group by looking at effects on
plants operating just above and below the capital threshold.
3.14.2.1 Medium- and long-term effects comparing with “already dereserved” producers
Using “already dereserved” producers (producers of goods dereserved before 2001) as an alternative
control group, table 3.15 shows that we arrive at an almost identical average effect on log(capital)
by 2006. There are fewer “already dereserved” goods producers, making estimation of distributions
of their characteristics less precise. Effects on employment are again similar, but effects on output
with this comparison group are much larger.
Table 3.15: CIC results: 2006 impacts - dereserved 2001-2006 vs. dereserved before 2001
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output)
0.2259 0.1228 0.3733***
(0.1555) (0.0865) (0.1264)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure described
in Athey and Imbens (2006).
By 2008 (table 3.16), the impact of the 2001-2006 dereservation had become so large that it
is statistically significant for all three outcomes. The evolution of the difference in the distribution
of capital is shown in figures 3.12 - 3.14. The pattern of responses between capital and labor is
consistent across tables 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16: capital increases by about twice as much as labor. This
contrasts with the results from Martin et al. (2014), where effects on capital and labor are similar
in magnitude. The difference may be due to Martin et al. (2014)’s inclusion of the 2006-2008
dereservations, when estimating the effect of dereservation is complicated by the large increase
in the threshold value of capital in 2006. Including these dereservations could mute the effect
of dereservation on capital by comparing the evolution of dereserved goods producers with still-
reserved goods producers who are also increasing their capital usage.
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Table 3.16: CIC results: 2008 impacts - dereserved 2001-2006 vs. dereserved before 2001
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output)
0.4954** 0.2285** 0.5906***
(0.2187) (0.1000) (0.1307)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure described
in Athey and Imbens (2006).
Figure 3.12: 2001 density of log(capital)
127
Figure 3.13: 2006 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.14: 2008 density of log(capital)
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